State v. Odom

── State v. Odom ── Court: Court of Appeals of Kansas Date: June 05, 2026 Category: General No. 128,209 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. MALCOLM MARQUIS ODOM, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(2) prohibits "possessing with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, a dagger, dirk, billy, blackjack, slungshot, dangerous knife, straight- edged razor, throwing star, stiletto or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument of like character." Because firearms are not "of like character" to the enumerated weapons and are covered in other subsections of this statute, this subsection does not apply to firearms. Appeal from Labette District Court; STEVEN A. STOCKARD, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed June 5, 2026. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Grace E. Tran, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Alan Brereton, deputy county attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. Before WARNER, C.J., ATCHESON and CLINE, JJ. CLINE, J.: A jury convicted Malcolm Marquis Odom of voluntary manslaughter, criminal possession of a weapon by a felon, and criminal use of a weapon after he shot and killed someone. On appeal, Odom claims he did not receive a fair trial because the 1 district court denied his motion to allow a prospective juror to testify in support of his motion for a new trial. He also challenges his convictions for criminal possession of a weapon by a felon and criminal use of a weapon. After reviewing the record, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Odom's motion. The court found the affidavit from the prospective juror (who came forward after the trial) provided insufficient detail to justify further inquiry. The prospective juror could not identify the individuals who made the alleged improper statements during a break in jury selection, making it impossible to determine whether any of them made it on the jury. Nor does Odom argue that any of the prospective jurors who made the statements were empaneled. As such, we do not find the court erred in concluding Odom failed to show juror misconduct occurred, much less that the alleged misconduct substantially impacted his right to a fair trial. As for Odom's conviction for criminal possession of a weapon by a felon, we agree the parties' elemental stipulation was insufficient but we find the error harmless based on his trial admissions. And as for Odom's conviction for criminal use of a weapon under K.S.A. 21- 6301(a)(2), we find this statutory provision does not apply to firearms. Because the jury was instructed that it could find Odom guilty for knowingly possessing a firearm, we find the jury instruction on this charge was clearly erroneous. Further, since the State offered no evidence that he possessed any weapon prohibited by this subsection, we find it presented insufficient evidence to support the charge. We therefore reverse this conviction. 2  REVIEW OF ODOM'S APPELLATE CHALLENGES Did the district court err in denying the motion to allow an individual who did not serve on the jury to testify about alleged misconduct during voir dire? Odom first challenges the district court's denial of his motion to allow a prospective juror (who we call Rebecca) to testify in support of his motion for a new trial. At some point after trial, Rebecca told Odom's sister (who worked at Rebecca's son's school) that she overheard improper statements made by other prospective jurors during a break in the jury selection process. Odom then filed a motion for a new tr