Peo v. Garcia-Gonzales

── Peo v. Garcia-Gonzales ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: June 04, 2026 Category: General 24CA0551 Peo v Garcia-Gonzales 06-04-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA0551 Weld County District Court No. 22CR1574 Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Norberto Garcia-Gonzales, Defendant-Appellant. SENTENCE AFFIRMED Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Fox and Dunn, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 4, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kirstiana Perryman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Norberto Garcia-Gonzales, appeals the district court’s sentence imposed following the court’s acceptance of a plea agreement under which Garcia-Gonzales pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving death. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 While driving his car, Garcia-Gonzales hit and killed a motorcyclist. After the crash, Garcia-Gonzales abandoned his car and fled the scene on foot. Officers later apprehended Garcia- Gonzales. The People charged him with leaving the scene of an accident involving death, careless driving, driving under restraint (alcohol related offense), and obstructing a peace officer. ¶3 Garcia-Gonzales entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution in which he agreed to plead guilty to leaving the scene of an accident and the People agreed to drop the remaining charges. The leaving the scene of an accident charge carried a presumptive sentencing range of four to twelve years in prison. See § 42-4- 1601(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (leaving the scene of an accident involving death is a class 3 felony); § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), C.R.S. 2025 (a class 3 felony has a presumptive sentencing range of four to twelve years). 1 ¶4 Under the plea agreement, Garcia-Gonzales also agreed that the court could consider aggravating circumstances, including two prior DUI convictions, in determining whether to increase his sentence under section 18-1.3-401(6). Under that statute, if the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence that is up to twice the maximum presumptive sentence — in this case, up to twenty-four years. See § 18-1.3-401(6). The court also advised Garcia-Gonzales of this possibility at the providency hearing, and Garcia-Gonzales said he understood that was what he had agreed to. ¶5 At Garcia-Gonzales’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested a sentence of twenty-four years based on aggravating factors. Specifically, the prosecutor mentioned Garcia-Gonzales’s criminal history, including the two prior DUI convictions. The prosecutor began discussing the facts of those cases. ¶6 Garcia-Gonzales’s counsel objected and argued that considering the facts of the prior convictions would be “judicial fact finding.” The court overruled the objection, saying that the parties had stipulated in the plea agreement that the cases could be 2  considered aggravating factors and it wouldn’t be “appropriate for the Court to disregard the case files in those cases.” ¶7 The prosecutor continued describing the facts underlying Garcia-Gonzales’s prior convictions: He has a strong odor of alcohol. He tells one officer that he had two and a half beers, he tells another officer that he had none. There is [a] bottle of [beer] found in the back of the car. Ultimately, his blood test comes back a .184 and he pleads guilty and is sentenced to