Peo v. Montoya
── Peo v. Montoya ──
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
Date: June 04, 2026
Category: General
23CA0860 Peo v Montoya 06-04-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0860
Alamosa County District Court No. 22CR5011
Honorable Kim Cortez-Rodriguez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Gilberto Andres Montoya,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 4, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Solicitor
General and Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Julieanne Farchione, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Gilberto Andres Montoya appeals his convictions for first
degree burglary, second degree burglary, and menacing with a
deadly weapon. We reverse his conviction for first degree burglary
but otherwise affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts from
the evidence introduced at trial.
¶3 One night, when a family, including a married couple (the
victims), returned home, they discovered that their front door was
open and that someone had entered the rental house where they
lived. The wife found Montoya, whom she recognized as the
landlord’s son, behind the house. She confronted Montoya, who
grabbed a steak knife and held it up to her. Montoya remained
behind the house, where he was arrested.
¶4 The victims smelled gasoline throughout the house. They also
discovered that the house had been “trashed” — an intruder had
strewn dishes and clothes everywhere, broken the hot water heater,
unplugged appliances, opened windows, and torn off closet doors.
¶5 Montoya was charged with first degree burglary, a class 3
felony; second degree burglary, a class 3 felony; and menacing with
1
a deadly weapon, a class 5 felony. The jury convicted Montoya as
charged.
¶6 On appeal, Montoya contends that the trial court erred by
(1) violating his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights;
(2) failing to instruct the jury that first degree trespass is a lesser
included offense of first and second degree burglary; (3) not merging
his convictions for second degree burglary and menacing into his
conviction for first degree burglary; (4) denying his requests for
certain state-paid support services; and (5) rejecting his requests for
a change of venue.
II. Analysis
A. Montoya’s Speedy Trial Rights
¶7 Montoya contends that the trial court violated his statutory
and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. We disagree.
¶8 Because a defendant’s constitutional and statutory speedy
trial rights are different, we analyze those rights separately. See
People v. Harris, 914 P.2d 425, 430 (Colo. App. 1995) (“The
constitutional right to a speedy trial, derived from the Sixth
Amendment and from Colo. Const. art. II, § 16, is distinct from the
2
statutory speedy trial right and the determination as to one does
not necessarily dispose of the other.”).
1. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Montoya’s
Statutory Speedy Trial Right
a. Standard of Review
¶9 We “review the [trial] court’s findings of fact for clear error,
disregarding them only if the record is devoid of support.” People v.
West, 2019 COA 131, ¶ 7, 461 P.3d 591, 596. However, we “review
de novo the trial court’s interpretation of Colorado’s speedy trial
statute.” Id.
b.
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}