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Neutral Court Opinion Jun 08, 2026

Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc.

── Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: June 04, 2026 Category: General The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. SUMMARY June 4, 2026 2026 COA 46 No. 25CA0491, Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. — Health and Welfare — Health Care Availability Act — Arbitration Agreements; Agency — Principal-Agent Relationship — Medical Durable Power of Attorney — Actual Authority — Apparent Authority A division of the court of appeals holds that a medical durable power of attorney (MDPOA) does not confer authority on the agent to enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf of her principal unless the MDPOA expressly grants that authority. Applying this holding, the division affirms the district court’s denial of a health care facility’s motion to compel arbitration. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 46 Court of Appeals No. 25CA0491 Pueblo County District Court No. 24CV30331 Honorable Michelle Chostner, Judge Vicki Reno, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie Henderson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. d/b/a Sharmar Village Care Center, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division VI Opinion by JUDGE BERGER* Gomez and Moultrie, JJ., concur Announced June 4, 2026 Reddick Law, PLLC, Brian D. Reddick, Matthew D. Swindle, Heather G. Zarchary, Little Rock, Arkansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee Hall & Evans, L.L.C., David B. Gelman, Jared R. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Defendant, Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. d/b/a Sharmar Village Care Center, Inc. (Sharmar), appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to compel arbitration with plaintiff, Vicki Reno, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marjorie Henderson. We affirm the order. ¶2 Following the analysis in Lujan v. Life Care Centers of America, 222 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2009), and Fresquez v. Trinidad Inn, Inc., 2022 COA 96, but disagreeing with one of the holdings in Moffett v. Life Care Centers of America, 187 P.3d 1140 (Colo. App. 2008) (Moffett I), aff’d on other grounds, 219 P.3d 1068 (Colo. 2009) (Moffett II), we hold that a medical durable power of attorney (MDPOA) does not confer authority on the agent to enter into an arbitration agreement with a health care provider on behalf of the principal unless that authority is expressly stated in the MDPOA. I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History ¶3 In 2014, Marjorie Henderson signed an MDPOA, appointing one of her daughters, Brenda Wills, as her attorney-in-fact.1 The 1 We use the terms “attorney-in-fact” and “agent” interchangeably throughout this opinion. 1 MDPOA specified the scope of actions Wills was authorized to take on Henderson’s behalf, including giving Wills authority (1) to act for her “in all matters relating to [Henderson’s] health care”; (2) “to consent . . . to all medical, surgical, hospital, and related health care treatments and procedures on [Henderson’s] behalf”; (3) “to sign any documents required to request [release from a facility
CourtListener · Jun 04, 2026
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