Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc.
── Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. ──
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
Date: June 04, 2026
Category: General
The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
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should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
June 4, 2026
2026 COA 46
No. 25CA0491, Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. — Health
and Welfare — Health Care Availability Act — Arbitration
Agreements; Agency — Principal-Agent Relationship — Medical
Durable Power of Attorney — Actual Authority — Apparent
Authority
A division of the court of appeals holds that a medical durable
power of attorney (MDPOA) does not confer authority on the agent
to enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf of her principal
unless the MDPOA expressly grants that authority. Applying this
holding, the division affirms the district court’s denial of a health
care facility’s motion to compel arbitration.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 46
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0491
Pueblo County District Court No. 24CV30331
Honorable Michelle Chostner, Judge
Vicki Reno, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Marjorie Henderson, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. d/b/a Sharmar Village Care Center, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER*
Gomez and Moultrie, JJ., concur
Announced June 4, 2026
Reddick Law, PLLC, Brian D. Reddick, Matthew D. Swindle, Heather G.
Zarchary, Little Rock, Arkansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Hall & Evans, L.L.C., David B. Gelman, Jared R. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. d/b/a Sharmar
Village Care Center, Inc. (Sharmar), appeals the district court’s
order denying its motion to compel arbitration with plaintiff, Vicki
Reno, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of
Marjorie Henderson. We affirm the order.
¶2 Following the analysis in Lujan v. Life Care Centers of America,
222 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2009), and Fresquez v. Trinidad Inn, Inc.,
2022 COA 96, but disagreeing with one of the holdings in Moffett v.
Life Care Centers of America, 187 P.3d 1140 (Colo. App. 2008)
(Moffett I), aff’d on other grounds, 219 P.3d 1068 (Colo. 2009)
(Moffett II), we hold that a medical durable power of attorney
(MDPOA) does not confer authority on the agent to enter into an
arbitration agreement with a health care provider on behalf of the
principal unless that authority is expressly stated in the MDPOA.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
¶3 In 2014, Marjorie Henderson signed an MDPOA, appointing
one of her daughters, Brenda Wills, as her attorney-in-fact.1 The
1 We use the terms “attorney-in-fact” and “agent” interchangeably
throughout this opinion.
1
MDPOA specified the scope of actions Wills was authorized to take
on Henderson’s behalf, including giving Wills authority
(1) to act for her “in all matters relating to [Henderson’s]
health care”;
(2) “to consent . . . to all medical, surgical, hospital, and
related health care treatments and procedures on
[Henderson’s] behalf”;
(3) “to sign any documents required to request [release from
a facility
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