SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY

── SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY ── Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Date: June 02, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0807 Sockwell Corners, LLC et al. v. Newton County On Appeal from the Superior Court of Newton County No. 2024CV1534 Decided: June 2, 2026 PETERSON, Chief Justice. This case raises the question of whether recent statutory amendments abrogate our precedent on whether OCGA § 5-6- 35(a)(1) requires appeals like this — an appeal from a decision of a superior court affirming a local zoning board’s decision to deny a request for rezoning of a particular piece of property — to come by discretionary application. Those amendments did not modify the statutory text that our precedent has long interpreted as requiring those appeals to come by application, nor did they change the fundamental character of the processes at issue. So we conclude that those amendments do not abrogate our precedent. Because the appellants here did not follow the discretionary application requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35, this appeal is dismissed. Sockwell Corners, LLC owns a tract of land currently zoned by Newton County as agricultural-residential. Sockwell Corners and proposed purchasers/developers Ed Hutter and Integral Enterprises, LLC (collectively, “the Appellants”) filed an application to rezone the property, but the application was denied by the Newton County Board of Commissioners on July 16, 2024. The Appellants then filed the underlying verified complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the property. Following a bench trial, the Superior Court rejected the Appellants’ as-applied constitutional challenge in an order entered on August 7, 2025. The Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court, asserting that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the case involves the constitutionality of an ordinance. The Appellants also indicated in their Notice of Appeal that the direct appeal was procedurally appropriate because “[OCGA] § 5-6- 34(a)(14) provid[es] for direct review of all final judgments or orders reviewing a zoning decision as such term is defined in [OCGA § 36-66-3(4)].” We directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the question of whether this appeal is subject to dismissal for the Appellants’ failure to follow the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35. “It is incumbent upon this Court, even when not raised by the parties, to inquire into its own jurisdiction.” Dias v. Boone, 320 Ga. 785, 789 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “The provisions of the law respecting the procedure to be followed in perfecting appeals to this Court are jurisdictional, and unless this Court has jurisdiction of a case, it is without power or authority to render a judgment upon review.” Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 172 (2019) (cleaned up). This includes