STATE OF GEORGIA v. FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, INC.

── STATE OF GEORGIA v. FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, INC. ── Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Date: June 02, 2026 Category: General NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0364 STATE OF GEORGIA et al. v. FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, INC. et al. On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County No. 2022CV364429 Argued: March 18, 2026  Decided: June 2, 2026 MCMILLIAN, Justice. Virgil Delano Presnell, Jr., has been on Georgia’s death row for decades. 1 After an execution order issued for him in April 2022, the Federal Defender Program, Inc. (“Federal Defender”), 2 filed an action for breach of contract on its own behalf against the State of Georgia and Christopher M. Carr in his official capacity as Attorney General (collectively, the “State”), claiming that the State breached an agreement about the timing and procedures that the State would follow in resuming executions for certain 1 See Presnell v. State, 274 Ga. 246 (2001), cert. denied, 535 US 1059 (2002). 2 The Federal Defender is a domestic non-profit corporation whose Capital Habeas Unit represents death row inmates in federal post-conviction proceedings and in state clemency proceedings. Presnell and the Georgia Ap- pellate Practice and Educational Resource Center, Inc., a domestic non-profit corporation whose attorneys represent death row inmates in state habeas pro- ceedings and in state clemency proceedings, later moved to intervene in the lawsuit, which was granted. We refer to these three collectively as the “Appel- lees.” death row inmates after the COVID-19 pandemic (the “Agree- ment”). In a prior opinion, this Court held that the Agreement was valid and enforceable and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction, which pro- hibited the State from pursuing execution orders for inmates cov- ered by the Agreement and which effectively stayed Presnell’s ex- ecution. 3 State v. Fed. Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 355 (2022) (“Federal Defender I”). The matter now returns on direct appeal from the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, concluding that one Agreement condition—that is, whether COVID-19 vaccines are “readily available to all members of the public” (the “Vaccine Con- dition”)—has not been met because vaccines are not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for children un- der six months old. Based on this conclusion, the trial court per- manently enjoined the State from resuming certain executions until the conditions and notice requirements of the Agreement are met. The State contends that, in granting partial summary judg- ment to the Appellees and in denying partial summary judgment to the State, the trial court erred by: (1) failing to apply the Agree- ment’s plain language and, instead, substituting a requirement that the Vaccine Condition is not satisfied until the FDA approves COVID-19 vaccines for children under six months old; (2) inter- preting the Vaccine Condition in a manner that results in an in- definite contract; and (3) imposing an overly broad injunction that goes beyond the