Speer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.

── Speer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. ── Court: Connecticut Appellate Court Date: June 02, 2026 Author: Elgo Category: General ************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Speer v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. SHERI SPEER v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE (AC 47748) Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment, following its grant- ing of the defendant’s motion for judgment and costs and the denial of her motions for leave to amend the operative complaint and to substitute a new party defendant. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant under a provision of the statute (§ 47-31 (e)) governing actions seeking to quiet title to certain real property when that statute only provides for a taxation of “costs.” Held: The trial court improperly awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant pursuant to § 47-31 (e), as that statute does not expressly authorize a court to award attorney’s fees to a disclaiming defendant, and, to the extent that § 47-31 (e) reflects the legislature’s intent to create a statutory exception to the American rule, that exception is expressly limited to the reimbursement of statutory costs and does not authorize a court to award a defendant reason- able attorney’s fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the operative complaint, filed after the defendant had sought judgment on the quiet title count, the only remaining count in the operative revised complaint, as it was well within the court’s discretion to deny the plaintiff’s request as untimely given the late stage in the proceed- ings, and the obvious purpose of the amendment was to resurrect a claim that the plaintiff had previously abandoned after repleading following the granting of a motion to strike. The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s request to substitute a new party defendant solely for the purpose of pursuing a claim that she had abandoned, as judgment had already entered on the quiet title count and no counts remained to be adjudicated in the action. Argued November 20, 2025—officially released June 2, 2026 Procedural History Action, inter alia, seeking to quiet title to certain real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London, where the court, Goodrow, J., granted the defendant’s motion to strike in part the complaint; thereafter, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint; subsequently, the court, Goodrow, J., granted the defendant’s motion for judgment and