Coffey v. Fast Easy Offer, LLC

── Coffey v. Fast Easy Offer, LLC ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: June 04, 2026 Category: General FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT VICKI COFFEY, on behalf of herself No. 25-4066 and all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 2:24-cv-02725- Plaintiff - Appellant, SPL v. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC; GFSG, OPINION LLC, doing business as Keller Williams Realty Phoenix; KELLER WILLIAMS REALTY, INC., Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 18, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Filed June 4, 2026 Before: MARSHA S. BERZON, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., AND ANDREW D. HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. 2 COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC SUMMARY * Telephone Consumer Protection Act The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and remanded for further proceedings. Vickey Coffey alleged that Fast Easy Offer, LLC, and other defendants violated the Act when contacting her through various phone calls and text messages. Based on the plain text of the Act’s definition of “telephone solicitation,” and consistent with Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that explicit mention of a good, product, or service is not necessary), the panel held that Coffey adequately pleaded that the messages at issue qualified as telephone solicitations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) defines telephone solicitation as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person.” The panel concluded that the “purpose” at issue is the purpose of the “initiation” of the call or message. Coffey alleged that one purpose of defendants’ initiation of the messages at issue was to solicit the purchase of real estate brokerage services, and she therefore sufficiently alleged that the messages were initiated for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of services. * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC 3 COUNSEL Adam W. Hansen (argued), Apollo Law LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Emma L. Freeman, Apollo Law LLC, Brooklyn, New York; Alexander D. Kruzyk, Pardell Kruzyk & Giribaldo PLLC, Austin, Texas; for Plaintiff-Appellant. Archis A. Parasharami (argued), Leif Overvold, and Daniel E. Jones, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Christopher J. Mikesh, Mayer Brown LLP, New York, New York; Eric M. Fraser, Osborn Maledon PA, Phoenix, Arizona; Anthony T. King and Megan M. Carrasco, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; James M. Cool, Frazer Ryan Goldberg & Arnold LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellees. OPINION M. SMITH, Circuit Judge: This case concerns how “telephone solicitation” is defined in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Plaintiff-Appellant Vicki Coffey alleges that Defendants- Appellees Fast Easy Offer, LLC, GFSG, LLC, and Keller Williams Realty, Inc., violated the TCPA when contacting her through various phone calls and text messages. Based on the plain text of the Act’s definition of “telephone solicitation” and consistent with our opinion in Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012), we hold that Coffey has adequately pleaded that the messages at issue here qualify as telephone solicitations. We accordingly reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing the 4