The City of Miramar, Florida v. Florida State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, Inc.

── The City of Miramar, Florida v. Florida State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: June 03, 2026 Category: General DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT THE CITY OF MIRAMAR, FLORIDA, and DELRISH MOSS, Appellants, v. FLORIDA STATE LODGE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, INC., and LEONARDO BRAGA, Appellees. No. 4D2025-1311 [June 3, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; William W. Haury, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 062024CA014072AXXXCE. Michelle Austin Pamies and Jordan Kira Gary of Austin Pamies Norris Weeks Powell, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants. Rose Szikszay and Paul Daragjati of Paul Daragjati PLC, Jacksonville, for appellees. FORST, J. Appellants, the City of Miramar (“the city”) and Miramar Police Department Chief Delrish Moss, appeal the trial court’s declaratory judgment that section 286.011(1), Florida Statutes (2024), requires arbitration hearings between a public employer and a public employee union to be open to the public. Appellants argue the trial court misinterpreted the statute’s plain language. We agree and reverse. Background Appellee Leonardo Braga was disciplined by the Miramar Police Department after an investigation determined he had violated the department’s policies. Appellee Florida State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (“the union”), filed a grievance pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the city and the union. The city denied the grievance.  The union demanded arbitration of the grievance pursuant to the CBA, and an arbitration hearing was scheduled. The parties disagreed about whether the hearing should be open or closed to the public. The union demanded that other union members be allowed to attend the hearing, while the city refused to proceed with the other union members present. The union filed a petition in the trial court seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court held a hearing and entered judgment for the union, ruling that labor arbitration hearings conducted pursuant to a public employee CBA are required to be open to the public pursuant to section 286.011(1). This appeal follows. Analysis We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. E.g., Bd. of Trs., Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 So. 3d 120, 123 (Fla. 2016). “In interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court . . . may not defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of such statute or rule, and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo.” Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. “Florida courts ‘follow the supremacy-of-text principle—namely, the principle that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.’” State v. Washington, 403 So. 3d 465, 470 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (quoting Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020)). “Thus, we interpret Florida’s constitution and statutes according to the plain meaning of their text, looking to ‘all the textual and structural clues that bear on the meaning of a disputed text’ and using the traditional interpretive canons for guidance where helpful.” Id. (quoting Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022)). I. Section 286.011(1) does not require arbitrations to be open to the public because an arbitrator is not a “board or commission.” All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, including meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office, at which offi