Parental Resp Conc SMA

── Parental Resp Conc SMA ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: May 28, 2026 Category: General 25CA1553 Parental Resp Conc SMA 05-28-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1553 Boulder County District Court No. 24DR30032 Honorable Robert R. Gunning, Judge In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.M.A., a Child, and Concerning Jordan Christopher Ashcraft, Appellant, and Elena Irene Barrera, Appellee. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 28, 2026 Jordan Christopher Ashcroft, Pro Se No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 Jordan Christopher Ashcraft (father) appeals the district court’s permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities between him and Elena Irene Barrera (mother). We affirm the judgment. I. Background ¶2 Father petitioned for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) for the parties’ shared child. The district court appointed a Child and Family Investigator (CFI) to make recommendations to the court concerning an APR. Following a permanent orders hearing, the court issued a detailed written ruling allocating father a step-up parenting plan and mother all other parenting time and sole decision-making responsibility. ¶3 Through the first phase of the plan, the court granted father six hours per week of professionally supervised parenting time. After three months of “consistent, safe” supervised time, the court permitted father six hours of unsupervised parenting time each week. After three months in that phase, the court allocated father two overnights every other weekend. 1  II. Parenting Time ¶4 Father contends that the district court abused its discretion by (1) ordering professionally supervised parenting time without making endangerment findings, and (2) imposing the step-up plan without making express findings justifying its duration or structure. We aren’t convinced. A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Principles ¶5 A district court enjoys broad discretion over parenting time matters, and we exercise every presumption in favor of upholding its decision. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 25. However, we review the court’s application of the law de novo. In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 10. ¶6 A court must allocate parenting time in accordance with the child’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the child’s safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025; see In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 43. In doing so, a court considers all relevant 2  factors, including those set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) (the best interests standard). ¶7 Section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025, (the endangerment standard) provides that a court can’t “restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). In addition to finding endangerment, any order imposing a restriction must “enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the restriction.” Id.; § 14- 10-124(1.5)(a). B. Supervised Parenting Time ¶8 Father first argues that the district court improperly restricted his parenting time through the professional supervision requirement. Specifically, he asserts that the court was required, but failed, t