Peo v. Rosales

── Peo v. Rosales ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: May 28, 2026 Category: General 24CA0331 Peo v Rosales 05-28-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA0331 Jefferson County District Court No. 01CR3022 Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Luque Rosales, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Martinez*, and Taubman*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 28, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Defendant, Daniel Luque Rosales, appeals the postconviction court’s order denying his most recent Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 In 2002, a jury found Rosales guilty of, among other offenses, two counts of first degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed the judgment. See People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429 (Colo. App. 2005) (Rosales I). ¶3 In May 2007, Rosales filed his first pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, raising numerous postconviction claims and requesting that postconviction counsel be appointed (the May 2007 motion). Later that month, the trial court issued a written order saying, “After reviewing Mr. Rosales’ motion, I believe it is appropriate to appoint counsel for Mr. Rosales, who is indigent. If the appointed counsel determines that there is merit to Mr. Rosales’ [motion], I will grant leave to amend the [motion] by Mr. Rosales’ counsel” (the May 2007 order). ¶4 In the appeal currently before us, the parties dispute whether the trial court actually appointed postconviction counsel, or instead 1  merely expressed an intent to do so in the May 2007 order. What is clear is that no attorney ever entered an appearance to represent Rosales on the May 2007 motion. ¶5 Then, in August 2007 — two and a half months after expressing at least an intent to appoint postconviction counsel — the trial court changed course by issuing a written order summarily denying the May 2007 motion (the August 2007 order). The court summarized its ruling as follows: After carefully considering Mr. Rosales’ multiple contentions and engaging in yet another review of his file and the trial record, I conclude that no hearing on his motion is necessary because the file and the record do not support his allegations. On the contrary, they clearly establish that Mr. Rosales is not entitled to the relief he seeks. Notably, the court also wrote, “For the same reason, I deny Mr. Rosales’ motion for appointment of postconviction counsel.” ¶6 On appeal, a division of this court affirmed the August 2007 order. See People v. Rosales, (Colo. App. No. 07CA1881, Mar. 26, 2009) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (Rosales II). In terms of the postconviction counsel issue, the division did not mention the 2  May 2007 order; it only mentioned the August 2007 denial of counsel. See id. ¶7 In 2016, Rosales filed his second pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion (the 2016 motion). As pertinent here, he raised ineffective assistance claims against the public defender’s office for not appearing on his behalf and filing a supplement to the May 2007 motion. ¶8 The postconviction court issued a written order summarily denying the