Peo v. Vaughan

── Peo v. Vaughan ── Court: Colorado Court of Appeals Date: May 28, 2026 Category: General 23CA1351 Peo v Vaughan 05-28-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 23CA1351 Larimer County District Court No. 06CR859 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Anthony Vaughan, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 28, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Robert Anthony Vaughan, appeals the district court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief. Because we conclude that Vaughan’s motion is time barred, we affirm. I. Background ¶2 Vaughan was charged with second degree kidnapping, second degree assault, menacing, and attempted first degree murder with a crime of violence sentence enhancer. The charges stemmed from allegations that he assaulted his common law wife over the course of five days. The prosecution later added one count each of tampering with a witness or victim and violation of a protection order. ¶3 After a trial, a jury convicted Vaughan of second degree assault, tampering with a witness or victim, and violation of a protection order. He was acquitted of the remaining counts. The district court imposed a controlling sentence of twenty years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. ¶4 On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed Vaughan’s judgment of conviction. See People v. Vaughan, (Colo. App. No. 12CA0970, July 3, 2014) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) 1  (Vaughan I). His conviction became final when this court issued its mandate on February 11, 2015. ¶5 In 2017, Vaughan filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a). Vaughan claimed his sentence was illegal because the district court failed to consider restitution at sentencing. The district court denied the motion, but a division of this court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the amount of restitution, if any. People v. Vaughan, (Colo. App. 18CA0299, May 9, 2019) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Vaughan II). ¶6 In 2021, Vaughan filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), alleging various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Vaughan asserted that he was “only filing this 35(c) at this time due to time limitations on [his] misdemeanor [conviction].” The district court appointed counsel, who supplemented the motion. In a section titled “Jurisdictional Issues,” counsel noted the three-year statutory time bar for collaterally attacking a conviction, the prior division’s correction of Vaughan’s illegal sentence (including the date of the mandate following that appeal — June 28, 2019), and the date Vaughan filed 2  his pro se motion, namely, March 17, 2021. The prosecution filed a written reply opposing the merits of the motion but did not address whether it was filed timely. In a written order, the court considered the timeliness of the motion: It appears to the court that the motion has been timely filed pursuant to C.R.S. § 16-5- 402(1) and the People do not argue otherwise. See, People v. St. John, 934 P.2d 865 (People waive time bar if not raised in the trial court). The district court then granted an evidentiary hearing on four of Vaughan’s claims b