Jawan Tarquinii v. Hung Cao

── Jawan Tarquinii v. Hung Cao ── Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Date: June 02, 2026 Category: General United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 24-5243 September Term, 2025 FILED ON: JUNE 2, 2026 JAWAN N. TARQUINII, APPELLANT v. HUNG CAO, ACTING SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, APPELLEE Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:21-cv-01567) Before: PILLARD, WILKINS, and KATSAS, Circuit Judges JUDGMENT The Court has considered this appeal and determined that a published opinion is unwarranted. See Fed. R. App. P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. I Jawan Tarquinii worked as a civilian at a United States Marine Corps base in Japan. She served as the chief of a human-resources department. An inspector-general investigation found that Tarquinii had improperly used her position to help hire her husband and brother. The Corps fired Tarquinii and rejected her administrative appeals. Tarquinii sued pro se. She alleged claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment against her. It reasoned that the government had stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination—violation of anti-nepotism rules—and that Tarquinii had produced insufficient evidence that this stated reason was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Tarquinii v. Del Toro, No. 21-cv-1567, 2024 WL 4298857 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2024). Tarquinii appealed pro se, and we appointed Ben Harris as amicus curiae to support her position. 1 1 Mr. Harris has ably discharged his responsibilities, and the Court thanks him for his assistance.  II We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Thompson v. District of Columbia, 832 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Like the district court, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. Title VII prohibits the federal government from discriminating against employees “based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). To establish Title VII liability, the plaintiff may show that one of these prohibited considerations was a “but-for cause” of an adverse employment action. Mayorga v. Merdon, 928 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the prohibited consideration was a “motivating factor” behind the adverse action. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). The latter causation standard is easier to meet, but plaintiffs invoking it cannot obtain damages or reinstatement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). In cases lacking direct evidence of discrimination, we apply the evidentiary framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This framework applies to both but-for and motivating-factor theories. See Mayorga, 928 F.3d at 89. When an employer proffers a legitimate reason for its action, we focus on whether “the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race” or another prohibited consideration. Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). This Court has held that “actual reason” does not mean “sole reason.” Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 845–46 (D.C. Cir. 2012).