Lopez-Pineda v. Blanche

── Lopez-Pineda v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Date: June 02, 2026 Category: Immigration Case: 25-60581 Document: 41-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/02/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED June 2, 2026 No. 25-60581 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk ____________ Bianka Paola Lopez-Pineda, Petitioner, versus Todd Wallace Blanche, Acting U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. ______________________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A206 366 696 ______________________________ Before Higginbotham, Engelhardt, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Bianka Paola Lopez-Pineda, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of the denial of her motion to reopen by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 25-60581 Document: 41-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/02/2026 No. 25-60581 reopen “under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Garcia v. Garland, 28 F.4th 644, 646 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Lopez-Pineda first argues the BIA erred in declining to apply equitable tolling to her motion-to-reopen filing deadline, as she was unable to file a meritorious motion until the issuance of Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), which altered the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b’s stop- time rule. This assertion, however, does not explain what steps she took to address her defective NTA in the years between Niz-Chavez’s issuance in 2021 and her untimely motion to reopen in 2024, and thus she fails to satisfy the first prong of the equitable-tolling standard. See Gonzalez Hernandez v. Garland, 9 F.4th 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining petitioner’s due- diligence requirement for entitlement to equitable tolling); see also Flores- Moreno v. Barr, 971 F.3d 541, 544–45 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that BIA did not abuse its discretion by requiring petitioner to provide evidence of at least some efforts during three-year period between consultations with different attorneys). Next, Lopez-Pineda asserts the BIA erred in rejecting her argument that an allegedly deficient notice to appear (NTA) divested the immigration court of jurisdiction. This argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See Maniar v. Garland, 998 F.3d 235, 242 n.2 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is ‘the regulations, not 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), [that] govern what a notice to appear must contain to constitute a valid charging document . . . [u]nder the regulations, a notice to appear is sufficient to commence proceedings even if it does not include the time, date, or place of the initial hearing.’” (citation omitted)); see also Garcia, 28 F.4th at 646-48. Nor has she shown the BIA abused its discretion in rejecting her due-process challenges to her removal proceedings based upon a deficient NTA. See Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 361 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding petitioners “[cannot] establish a