Schiro, Schiro v. Elliott, Estate of Sally A. Napuunoa

── Schiro, Schiro v. Elliott, Estate of Sally A. Napuunoa ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: May 29, 2026 Category: General DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JOEL SCHIRO and TAMMY SCHIRO, Appellants, v. KIM L. ELLIOTT, as personal representative of the Estate of Sally A. Napuunoa, deceased, Appellee. No. 2D2025-2366 May 29, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Caroline Tesche Arkin, Judge. Matthew C. Scarborough and Amy Lee of Scarborough Attorneys at Law, Tampa, for Appellants. Marley Dodd of Zoecklein Law, P.A., Brandon, for Appellee. SILBERMAN, Judge. Joel and Tammy Schiro seek review of an order entered in probate court determining that property held by the Sally A. Napuunoa Trust (the Trust) retained its homestead status. Because the probate court correctly ruled that the property was the protected homestead of Ms. Napuunoa and that, upon her death, the homestead protection from creditors' claims, including the Schiros, inured to her three children, we affirm. Following the death of her mother, Kim L. Elliott filed an amended petition seeking a determination from the probate court that her mother's residence constituted protected homestead property exempt from the claims of creditors. The petition asserted that upon her mother's death, title to the property descended to the mother's heirs and retained its constitutional exemption from creditor's claims. The Schiros are judgment creditors of Ms. Napuunoa and each filed a statement of claim in the probate case. They moved to dismiss Ms. Elliott's amended petition, arguing that homestead protection is limited to the surviving spouse and minor children. The trial court denied their motion to dismiss after a hearing and thereafter entered the order on appeal. The Schiros argue that the trial court erred for several reasons. They first contend that the property belongs to the Estate of Sally A. Napuunoa, not the Trust, because her Will provides the personal representative, Ms. Elliott, with the power to lease or sell "any real or personal property belonging to my estate." They contend that because the property is part of the Estate, it should be sold to pay creditors of the Estate. However, the Schiros alternatively argue that if the property belongs to the Trust, it should be sold to pay creditors because the Will states, "I have provided for the payment of all my debts, expenses of administration of property wherever situated passing under this will or otherwise and estate, inheritance, transfer and succession taxes, that become due by reason of my death, under THE SALLY A. NAPUUNOA TRUST . . . ." 2  We conclude that the trial court correctly found that the property is part of the Trust, not the Estate, and that it was the protected homestead of Ms. Napuunoa. The record reflects that the property is titled in the name of the Trust, and when a property is held in a revocable trust, it is "owned by a 'natural person' for purposes of the constitutional homestead exemption." Engelke v. Est. of Engelke, 921 So. 2d 693, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Ms. Napuunoa maintained an ownership interest in her residence, even though the revocable Trust held title to the property, because she retained the right to revoke the Trust. See id. Therefore, the property was the protected homestead of Ms. Napuunoa even though it was titled in the name of the Trust. When Ms. Napuunoa passed, the property's homestead status passed to her heirs. Article X, section 4, of the Florida Constitution provides, in relevant part: (a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement