Paez Montiel v. Blanche

── Paez Montiel v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: June 01, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 24-965 VERONICA IVONNE PAEZ MONTIEL, Agency No. A208-594-016 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 22, 2026** Pasadena, CA Before: N.R. SMITH, BENNETT, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Veronica Ivonne Paez Montiel is a native and citizen of Mexico. She petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her second motion to reopen proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1  Petitioner argues that the BIA committed legal error by failing to review her motion to reopen under the “exceptional situations” or “exceptional circumstances” standard.1 She further contends that the BIA should not have treated her motion to reopen as a request to terminate proceedings under Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I. & N. Dec. 648 (A.G. 2022). Neither argument succeeds here. The BIA may exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen a case on its own motion in “truly exceptional” situations. In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1134 (BIA 1999). But judicial review of the BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte is limited; we have previously recognized that the “‘exceptional situation’ benchmark does not provide a sufficiently meaningful standard to permit judicial review.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002)). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority only “so as to assure that the Board made its discretionary decision on the correct understanding of the applicable legal principles.” Id. at 584; see also Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2020) (limiting review to “those situations where it is obvious that the agency has denied sua sponte relief not as a matter of discretion, but because it erroneously believed 1 Petitioner does not contest the BIA’s findings that her second motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred. 2 that the law forbade it from exercising its discretion . . . or that exercising its discretion would be futile”). The BIA did not misunderstand a legal principle. “Exceptional situations” and “exceptional circumstances” are not judicially manageable standards. And the BIA did not, as Petitioner suggests, rely on Matter of Coronado Acevedo or use “limited circumstances” as the standard for declining to reopen removal proceedings. Rather, the BIA appears to have cited the case simply to show the authority it would rely on if it were to terminate proceedings. Nor did the BIA misconstrue Petitioner’s motion. Though the motion initially requests that proceedings be reopened and stayed, it later states: “[W]e are requesting that proceedings be Reopen[ed] and be terminated for minor to proceed with [Special Immigrant Juveni