United States v. Leroy Roebuck, Jr.
── United States v. Leroy Roebuck, Jr. ──
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date: May 27, 2026
Category: General
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 24-2863
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LEROY ROEBUCK, JR.,
Appellant
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Appeal from the District Court, D.V.I.
Judge Wilma A. Lewis, No. 1:23-cr-00009-001
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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 15, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, CHUNG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 27, 2026)
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OPINION 1
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1
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Effects of hindsight often breed dissatisfaction. We can be infallible ex post,
but the reality is that we function ex ante—and then endure the consequences.
Monday morning has a cruel way of clarifying Sunday night’s mistakes. Mulligans
are seldom offered. And so it goes.
Appellant Leroy Roebuck, Jr. waived his right to appeal pursuant to a plea
agreement he executed with the Government. He nevertheless seeks to challenge the
propriety of the criminal sentence he ultimately received. But because the appellate
waiver is valid, we will enforce it and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I
On Leap Day, 2024, Roebuck entered into an agreement to plead guilty to one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). As the agreement recited,
this crime carried the possibility of “up to 20 years [(240 months)] imprisonment.”
A12. But, pursuant to the bargain struck, the Government promised to recommend
that Roebuck serve no more than 71 months. In exchange for this concession,
Roebuck:
expressly waive[d]: (1) the right to appeal his conviction,
any sentence within the maximum provided in the
statute(s) of conviction, and the manner in which that
sentence was determined, on any ground whatsoever; and
(2) the right to file any collateral attack, or any other writ
2
or motion, including but not limited to a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, which challenges his conviction or the
sentence imposed by the court.
A19. He did so aware that, despite the Government’s recommendation, the District
Court could still “impose any sentence, up to the statutory maximum.” A16.
At the plea colloquy, the presiding magistrate2 confirmed that Roebuck had
entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. The judge also advised Roebuck
of the “maximum penalties” he faced, SA16, and established that he understood “that
the sentence ultimately imposed may be different from any estimate [that his]
attorney may have given to [him],” SA18. And the judge ensured that Roebuck knew
he had “waived [his] . . . right to appeal or collaterally attack all or part of any
sentence imposed.” SA19.
True to its word, at sentencing, the Government recommended 71 months
imprisonment. The District Court, however, imposed a heftier penalty of 97 months,
at the low end of Roebuck’s advisory guidelines range. Roebuck filed a timely
(though, as we shall see, verboten) appeal.
2
Pursuant to Local Rule 59.1 of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, “Magistrate Judges
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}