Anderson v. Municipality of Anchorage

── Anderson v. Municipality of Anchorage ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: June 01, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROBERT ANDERSON, No. 24-4503 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:21-cv-00139-SLG v. MEMORANDUM* MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 29, 2026** Before: RAWLINSON, H.A. THOMAS, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges. Robert Anderson, an owner of real property located in Anchorage, Alaska, filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Municipality of Anchorage (the “Municipality”), challenging the constitutionality of (a) the Municipality’s tax assessor’s entry onto the curtilage of his property without a warrant or prior * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). consent and (b) the Municipality’s levy of a 10% penalty on delinquent taxes without prior notice of delinquency. Anderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of all but one of his seven claims for failure to state a claim, and the district court’s dismissal of his remaining claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As to the latter claim, the court held that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred judicial review. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Although the Municipality did not initially contest jurisdiction below and most of Anderson’s claims were dismissed on the merits, we have “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “We review the existence of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Hyatt v. Yee, 871 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2017). We hold that the Tax Injunction Act (the “Act”) deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over Anderson’s action in its entirety. The Act provides that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The Act’s prohibition is a “broad jurisdictional barrier,” Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 2 24-4503 U.S. 821, 825 (1997), which “limit[s] drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes,” California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408–09 (1982) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)). First, Anderson plainly seeks to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection” of local property taxes. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Alaska state law requires assessors to annually “assess property at its full and true value.” Alaska Stat. § 29.45.110(a); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (defining an “assessment” as “the official recording of liability that triggers levy and collection effort