Erick Rohl v. Stephen Rohl, Trustee of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust

── Erick Rohl v. Stephen Rohl, Trustee of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust ── Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware Date: May 27, 2026 Category: General COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE LOREN MITCHELL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400 MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734 May 27, 2026 Kathleen DeLacy, Esquire Phillip A. Giordano, Esquire Martin D. Page, Esquire Madeline R. Silverman, Esquire Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP Gordon, Fournaris & Mammarella P.A. 1521 Concord Pike, Suite 305 1925 Lovering Avenue Wilmington, DE 19803 Wilmington, DE 19806 RE: Erick Rohl v. Stephen Rohl, Trustee of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust, C.A. No. 2025-0381-LM Dear Counsel: As you are aware, Plaintiff Erick Rohl (“Plaintiff”) brings claims against Defendant Stephen Rohl (“Defendant”), individually and as trustee of the Adolph E. Rohl Trust (the “Trust”), for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and unjust enrichment arising from Defendant’s administration of Trust assets following the death of the settlor, Adolph Rohl, in 2022.1 Plaintiff alleges self-dealing and imprudent administration that purportedly conferred improper personal benefits on Defendant.2 For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 1 Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1. 2 Id. C.A. No. 2025-0381-LM May 27, 2026 Page 2 of 6 The Defendant seeks dismissal under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).3 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 12 Del. C. § 3585 (“Section 3585”) because in Defendant’s view, Plaintiff received disclosures sufficient to trigger the statute’s one-year period.4 Defendant contends that Section 3585 operates as a statute of repose depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 5 Plaintiff disputes both the characterization of Section 3585 and the sufficiency of any disclosures. 6 “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we (1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague allegations as ‘well pleaded’ if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and (4) do not affirm a dismissal unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.”7 Defendant’s motion depends upon findings that the accounting materials adequately disclosed the facts constituting Plaintiff’s claims and that those disclosures triggered Section 3585 as a matter of law. The present record does not 3 See D.I. 9. 4 12 Del. C. § 3585 (b). 5 See D.I. 9. at 9. 6 See D.I. 11. 7 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011). C.A. No. 2025-0381-LM May 27, 2026 Page 3 of 6 permit those conclusions. At this stage, the Court’s task is limited to the well- pleaded allegations and documents integral to or incorporated in the complaint; it cannot resolve factual disputes about what was disclosed or when on a motion to dismiss. Section 3585 limits claims arising out of a “report that adequately disclosed the facts constituting a claim” to one year from the date the report was sent, but only if the report adequately discloses the facts constituting the claim. 8 Here, Plaintiff alleges self-dealing, imprudent administration, and improper personal benefit arising from Defendant’s conduct as trustee. 9 Whether a report ‘adequately disclosed’ the fiduciary misconduct alleged is a fact-intensive inquiry ill-suited for resolution on a motion to dismiss. 10