In re the Marriage of Nicholas Jay Dale and Nicole Jehlicka Dale., Respondent:

── In re the Marriage of Nicholas Jay Dale and Nicole Jehlicka Dale., Respondent: ── Court: Supreme Court of Colorado Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General 1 2026 CO 35 In re the Marriage of Nicholas Jay Dale Petitioner and Nicole Jehlicka Dale., Respondent: No. 25SC220 Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc May 26, 2026           Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 24CA1065           Attorney for Petitioner: Henry L. Solano           Denver, Colorado           Attorneys for Respondent:           KHM Attorneys at Law           Alexander Masterson           Colorado Springs, Colorado           Law Office of Joel M. Pratt           Joel M. Pratt           Colorado Springs, Colorado 2           JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined. JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurred in the judgment.           OPINION 3           SAMOUR, JUSTICE.          ¶1 Not all adjustments to parenting time rights are cut from the same cloth -some modify those rights while others restrict them. Colorado law distinguishes between modifications and restrictions, and this case requires us to explore where the difference lies.          ¶2 The statute before us permits courts to "modify" parenting time rights-including by reducing the quantity of parenting time -if such modification is in "the best interests of the child." § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2025). But there is a wrinkle: Courts may not "restrict" parenting time rights unless they find "that the parenting time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development." § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). Thus, in the realm of parenting time rights, the legislature separated modification from restriction, assigning one standard to guide the former and another to steer the latter-leaving no room for the two categories to merge.[1]          ¶3 Nicholas Jay Dale ("Father") nevertheless argues that an order modifying parenting time rights by substantially reducing the quantity of parenting time drifts into the restriction zone and therefore triggers the heightened endanger/impair 4 standard. But Father's contention runs headlong into a fundamental barrier - the familiar principles of statutory construction.          ¶4 Those principles carry the day here. We conclude that a purely quantitative reduction in parenting time -i.e., a reduction unaccompanied by qualitative constraints on the manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises parenting time-cannot amount to a restriction of parenting time rights unless the reduction eliminates parenting time altogether.[2] We further conclude that a restriction of parenting time rights refers to the complete elimination of any quantity of parenting time (i.e., zero parenting time) or to qualitative constraints on the manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises parenting time.          ¶5 This is not to say that placing any qualitative term or condition on parenting time-including a minor one-constitutes a restriction. To be clear, to constitute a restriction, a qualitative adjustment must amount to a qualitative constraint - an adjustment that circumscribes the manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises parenting time, including, for example, requiring that parenting 5 time be supervised, prohibiting overnight visits, or specifying the location where parenting time may take place.          ¶6 Thus, a restriction is either a quantitative reduction to zero parenting time or the imposition of qualitative constraints on parenting time; any other adjustment is merely a modification. This reading of modification and restriction exposes one of the insurmountable flaws in Father's approach. Were we to agree with Father -and accept that any substantial reduction in the quantity of paren