People v. Johnson CA4/3

── People v. Johnson CA4/3 ── Court: California Court of Appeal Date: May 28, 2026 Category: General Filed 5/28/26 P. v. Johnson CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, G064810 v. (Super. Ct. No. M-19955) MICHAEL JOHNSON, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed. Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Servidal, Assistant Attorney General, Paige B. Hazard, Steve Oetting and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * *  A jury found defendant Michael Johnson to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). An SVP is “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal 1 behavior.” (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Johnson’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jurors that they needed to unanimously agree on which diagnosed mental disorder he has (a unanimity instruction). But long-standing case law makes clear that “a unanimity instruction does not apply in SVP civil commitment proceedings.” (People v. Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 59 (Fulcher); see also People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 347 (Carlin).) We see no reason to depart from these holdings; therefore, we affirm the judgment. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1973, Jane Doe One (JD1) was at a laundromat doing laundry when Johnson came up behind her and demanded sex. When JD1 refused, Johnson physically assaulted her, took her into a public bathroom, and sexually assaulted her. Johnson was convicted of rape. In 1978, Johnson was at the home of his cousin JD2, shortly after being released from prison. Johnson gave JD2 a note saying that he wanted to have sex with her. When JD2 refused, Johnson physically and sexually assaulted her. Johnson was convicted of rape. 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code; we will also omit the word “subdivision” or “subd.” 2  In June 1993, JD3 was in her home when she heard a knock at her front door. Johnson violently forced his way in. Johnson grabbed a knife from the kitchen and pointed it JD3’s neck. Johnson ordered JD3’s five-year- old son to go into the bathroom and close the door. Johnson tried to rape JD3, but was unable to do so. Johnson fled when JD3’s husband arrived home. Johnson was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape. In November 1993, JD4 came home and saw Johnson at her front door. Johnson entered her home and refused to leave. Johnson forcibly grabbed JD4, told her not to scream, and threatened t