Gonzalez Hernandez v. Blanche

── Gonzalez Hernandez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARINA DEL CARMEN GONZALEZ No. 25-2806 HERNANDEZ, Agency No. A209-428-894 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 22, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: N.R. SMITH, BENNETT, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges. Marina Del Carmen Gonzalez Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he REAL ID Act requires that credibility determinations be made on the basis of the ‘totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.’” Id. at 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The Act “permits IJs to consider factors such as demeanor, candor, responsiveness, plausibility, inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and falsehoods to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2022). And “only the most extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The agency’s determination rests on two sets of inconsistencies. The first stems from Gonzalez Hernandez’s testimony about an encounter with her former partner, 2 25-2806 Fernando. Gonzalez Hernandez’s application for asylum and withholding of removal is based on her claim that Fernando abused her. Before the IJ, Gonzalez Hernandez explained that she fled to her mother’s house to escape Fernando’s abuse, but he came looking for her. Gonzalez Hernandez testified that her mother told Fernando she was not there. In her sworn declaration, however, Gonzalez Hernandez stated that her sister spoke to Fernando. When the IJ confronted Gonzalez Hernandez with the declaration, she changed her testimony and claimed it was her sister. But the letter her sister submitted to the agency does not mention the encounter. The second set of inconsistencies stems from information Gonzalez Hernandez included on a visa application. On March 12, 2016, Gonzalez Hernandez a