Sorto-Lopez v. Blanche

── Sorto-Lopez v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ENRIQUE NOE SORTO-LOPEZ, No. 21-88 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-311-357 v. TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted April 20, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Enrique Sorto-Lopez, a native and citizen of Honduras, challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal from the denial of his application for cancellation of removal and, alternatively, voluntary departure. We deny the petition. The agency “may” grant a petitioner cancellation of removal if several * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. statutory criteria are established. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Because the second step in the cancellation-of-removal analysis involves a discretionary decision by the agency, we lack jurisdiction over the final judgment and may only review legal and constitutional challenges. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) & (D); Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 158 F.4th 944, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 221–22, 225, 225 n.4 (2024)). Section 1229c outlines the requirements for voluntary departure. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1). We lack jurisdiction to review denials of voluntary departure, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f), and may only review legal and constitutional challenges, Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2022). We limit our review to the BIA’s decision, except where the BIA expressly adopted the immigration judge’s (IJ) opinion. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (as amended). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Id. 1. Juvenile Record. Sorto-Lopez first argues that the agency erred by considering his sealed California juvenile record in denying discretionary relief. It is undisputed that Sorto-Lopez did not raise this challenge to the IJ or the BIA. We may only review exhausted claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Suate- Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024). “[T]he noncitizen must put the BIA on notice of the challenge, and the BIA must have an opportunity to pass on 2 21-88 the issue.” Suate-Orellana, 101 F.4th at 629 (citation modified). If the BIA addresses a claim on the merits, however, “regardless of the clarity with which [the petitioner] raised the . . . argument in his briefs,” the issue is exhausted. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Sorto-Lopez argues he is excused from failing to exhaust this challenge for two reasons. First, Sorto-Lopez insists that despite his failure to raise the issue, the BIA was “aware of the problem,” id., because of its own caselaw regarding the consideration of juvenile records. This argument fails because neither the BIA nor this court has answered whether the agency may consider sealed juvenile records when determining whether to grant discretionary relief. The BIA’s precedent that Sorto-Lopez c