Jobes v. City of Bellevue

── Jobes v. City of Bellevue ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUSTIN JOBES, No. 24-6656 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00839-TSZ v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF BELLEVUE, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 22, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff-Appellant Justin Jobes appeals the grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee the City of Bellevue (the City). Jobes alleges religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). seq, and the Washington Law Against Discrimination.1 Because the district court correctly concluded that the City tried to reasonably accommodate Jobes, we affirm. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de novo the district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment.” Alaska R.R. Corp. v. Flying Crown Subdivision Addition No. 1 & Addition No. 2 Prop. Owners Ass’n, 89 F.4th 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2023). The grant of summary judgment should be upheld if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). To be eligible for summary judgment on an affirmative defense, the party asserting that defense must “affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). As a threshold matter, Jobes argues that the district court’s issuance of an oral rather than written order of summary judgment automatically constitutes a reason to reverse the grant of summary judgment.. This argument is incorrect. We have held 1 The claim under Washington law is guided by federal Title VII caselaw and thus both claims rise or fall together. See Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193, 197 (Wash. 2014). 2 24-6656 that a written memorandum is not necessary to grant summary judgment; a reasoned oral order combined with the order granting summary judgment suffices. See, e.g., Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Schimmels, 85 F.3d 416, 421 (9th Cir. 1996). Turning to the merits, since Jobes made a prima facie claim under Title VII, the City can rebut that claim via an affirmative defense if it can “show that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee’s religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Petersen v. Snohomish Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,