Verge v. City of Los Angeles

── Verge v. City of Los Angeles ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK VERGE; ARTS AMERICANA, No. 25-669 LLC, D.C. No. 2:24-cv-01622-HDV-AGR Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation; DOES, 1-10 inclusive, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 21, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark Verge and Arts Americana, LLC appeal the district court’s dismissal, without leave to amend, of their complaint against the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). City of Los Angeles and unnamed defendants for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the City’s enforcement of its residential hotel conversion ordinance (the Ordinance), L.A. Municipal Code (LAMC) §§ 47.70-47.89, against them. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. “We review the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim and the legal issues it presents de novo.” Seven Arts Filmed Ent. Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ claims must be supported by a cognizable legal theory and have sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). 1. The district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. To support that claim, Plaintiffs “must establish a causal connection between the government defendant’s retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s subsequent injury.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–99 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). Given that the City issued the initial Notice to Comply before Plaintiffs’ alleged petitioning activity, their complaint does not support the inference that the Defendants’ actions were motivated by retaliatory animus. 2. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is based on the City’s “threats to 2 25-669 inspect the hotel without a warrant or consent.” The Fourth Amendment “protects two types of expectations, one involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’” Lavan v. City of L.A., 693 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs allege no facts that show any imminent “threat” to inspect their property without consent or a warrant. Rather, their only specific allegation is that the City “demanded” permission to inspect the property at issue, which necessarily required Plaintiffs’ consent. These allegations are insufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim. 3. Plaintiffs assert both a per se takings claim and a regulatory takings claim under Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). A per se taking requires showing either (1) permanent physical invasion of property or (2) regulations that