United States v. Hackett

── United States v. Hackett ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 27, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 23-595 25-2247 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. v. 3:18-cr-03072-TWR-1 MEMORANDUM* ANDREW HACKETT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SCARSI, District Judge.** A federal jury convicted Defendant Andrew Hackett of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud, and this court upheld his convictions on appeal. United States v. Hackett, 123 F.4th 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024). * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Defendant now appeals the district court’s order of restitution and order denying his pro se motions for appointment of counsel and for a new trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 1. Defendant argues that the district court erred by ordering restitution more than 90 days after sentencing, by including victims’ losses outside the time frame alleged in the indictment, and by failing to make explicit findings addressing his disputes over the restitution calculation. “[W]e review de novo a restitution order and the district court’s valuation methodology.” United States v. Solakyan, 119 F.4th 575, 594 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 91 (2025). “[T]he restitution calculation is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with any underlying factual findings reviewed for clear error.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2020)). The district court entered its order of restitution more than five months after sentencing, beyond the 90 days prescribed by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5). Although Defendant argues he lacked notice of the court’s intent to order restitution, he “does not claim that any documents or witnesses had become unavailable after the 90-day period elapsed,” “that his financial status changed,” or that “the delay caused any prejudice to his defense whatsoever.” United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, even if the district court erred in ordering restitution after the 90-day period 2 23-595; 25-2247 elapsed, Defendant’s challenge fails because he fails to demonstrate how any delay prejudiced him. See id. (affirming restitution order entered over 90 days after sentencing where “the district court’s error in failing to comply with the 90-day time limit was harmless”); United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause the procedural requirements of section 3664 were designed to protect victims, not defendants, the failure to comply with them is harmless error absent actual prejudice to the defendant.”). Next, Defendant challenges the inclusion of victims’ losses through April 2018 in the restitution order on the ground that th