United States v. Thomas Shrader

── United States v. Thomas Shrader ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General USCA4 Appeal: 24-6747 Doc: 13 Filed: 05/26/2026 Pg: 1 of 5 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-6747 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. THOMAS CREIGHTON SHRADER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (1:09-cr-00270-1; 1:13-cv-33098) Submitted: February 25, 2026 Decided: May 26, 2026 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part and affirmed as modified in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas Creighton Shrader, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6747 Doc: 13 Filed: 05/26/2026 Pg: 2 of 5 PER CURIAM: Thomas Creighton Shrader appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for voluntary recusal and the order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as an unauthorized, successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and denying it on that basis. We affirm in part and affirm as modified in part. “We review a district court’s denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion.” Megaro v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151, 163 (4th Cir. 2023). A district court judge “shall” recuse herself from “any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or “[w]here [she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Notably, however, judicial rulings and “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in part by denying Shrader’s recusal motion as moot. Although Shrader’s motion to recuse the magistrate judge was moot due to the judge’s retirement, there was in fact a matter pending before the district court—Shrader’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion—when the court considered Shrader’s motion to recuse the district court judge. See United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 653 (4th Cir. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6747 Doc: 13 Filed: 05/26/2026 Pg: 3 of 5 2024) (explaining that district court abuses its discretion when it “relies on erroneous factual . . . premises” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, we conclude that Shrader has not established grounds for vacating the district court’s order. See Platt v. Mansfield, 162 F.4th 430, 446 (4th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “we may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Shrader’s motion was based on his disagreement with the district court judge’s rulings in his case, and our review of the record confirms that there was no “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” displayed against Shrader. Lentz, 524 F.3d at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Megaro, 66 F.4th at 163 (“A presiding judge is not required