Freccia v. Freccia

── Freccia v. Freccia ── Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut Date: May 26, 2026 Author: Mullins Category: General ************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Freccia v. Freccia THERESA K. FRECCIA, EXECUTOR (ESTATE OF FRANK J. FRECCIA, JR.) v. FRANK J. FRECCIA III ET AL. (SC 21138) Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff brought a summary process action, seeking to gain possession of certain property after the defendants continued to occupy the property beyond the expiration of the lease. The property, which was originally owned by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s husband, F, as joint tenants, vested in the plaintiff after F’s death. The plaintiff commenced her summary process action in her capacity as “executor,” purportedly of F’s estate, and the notice to quit that was served on the defendants, which was signed by the plaintiff’s attorney, also indicated that it was being issued by the plaintiff in her capac- ity as executor. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute herself, in her individual capacity, as the plaintiff. The trial court ultimately rendered judgment of possession for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court. Before the Appellate Court, the plaintiffs claimed for the first time that the notice to quit was invalid and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action insofar as the notice to quit did not comply with the statute (§ 47a-23 (a)) requiring that such notice be issued by either the owner of the property or the owner’s legal representative, attorney-at- law or attorney-in-fact. The defendants specifically contended that, when the notice to quit was served on them, the plaintiff owned the property in her individual capacity, but the notice was signed by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff in her capacity as an executor. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the notice to quit had complied with § 47a-23 (a). On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to this court. Held: Although this court disagreed with the Appellate Court that the notice to quit strictly complied with § 47a-23 (a), any defect in the notice was circum- stantial and did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the statute (§ 52-123) excusing circumstantial defects in pleadings and certain judicial proceedings. When viewed in its entirety, the notice to quit contained a defect insofar as it conveyed that it was being issued by the plaintiff in her cap