Vaca Prado v. Blanche

── Vaca Prado v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAVIER VACA PRADO, No. 25-161 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-145-337 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 21, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: WARDLAW, BEA, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Javier Vaca Prado (“Petitioner”) appeals an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision, which had denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) and his request for post-conclusion voluntary departure. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite them only as necessary to explain our decision. Under § 1229b(b)(1), the Attorney General may exercise discretion to cancel an alien’s removal if the alien “(A) ha[s] been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of ten years or more, (B) ha[s] been a person of good moral character during that time, (C) ha[s] not been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, and (D) ‘establish[es] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.’” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting § 1229b(b)(1)). Only the fourth criterion is at issue in this appeal. We “review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent that it expressly adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[W]e … apply a deferential standard of review to the primarily factual mixed question at hand—whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts—by reviewing for substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1003 (footnote 2 25-161 omitted) (citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024)). Under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence standard of review, “we may grant a petition only if the petitioner shows that the evidence ‘compels the conclusion’ that the BIA’s decision was incorrect.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). First, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner’s removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for Petitioner’s U.S.- citizen wife or son.1 See § 1229b(b)(1)(D); Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007– 08. The BIA found that Petitioner’s wife and son would remain in the U.S. in the home of Petitioner’s mother-in-law, and Petitioner’s wife would continue to receive health benefits to treat her diabetes. The BIA acknowledged tha