United States v. Gerrans

── United States v. Gerrans ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6740 D.C. Nos. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cv-00801-EMC 3:18-cr-00310-EMC-1 v. LAWRENCE J. GERRANS, AKA Larry MEMORANDUM* Gerrans, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 21, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges; Concurrence by Judge Forrest. Lawrence J. Gerrans appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his convictions and sentence for wire fraud, money * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). laundering, making false statements, contempt of court, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. Gerrans argues that the record established his trial counsel was ineffective pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and violated his right to maintain his innocence pursuant to McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018). In the alternative, Gerrans contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing on both questions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). We review de novo the denial of a § 2255 motion, United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004), and review any factual findings for clear error, United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). We review for abuse of discretion “[a] district court’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion.” United States v. Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2000). Because the parties are familiar with the record, we do not recount the facts in their entirety. We affirm the district court’s order denying Gerrans’s motion. 1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. A federal jury convicted Gerrans on all 12 counts of the second superseding indictment. Gerrans argues that his trial counsel, Getz, rendered ineffective assistance and that he was prejudiced by these deficiencies. “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raises a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo.” Id. at 1158. We conclude that, even if Gerrans’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Gerrans has not met his 2 24-6740 burden of proving prejudice as required by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement, Gerrans “must show that there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different” after “consider[ing] the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury.” Id. at 694–95. Counts 1–3 charged Gerrans with wire fraud and Count 6 charged him with money laundering related to transfers of funds from Sanovas, Inc. The evidence showed that Gerrans made three transfers to himself: $80,000 to his company Halo Management Group on March 13, 2015 (Count 1); $250,000 to his company Hartford Legend Capital Enterprises on March 16, 2015 (Co