United States v. Chow

── United States v. Chow ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-4225 D.C. Nos. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:20-cv-09342-CRB 3:14-cr-00196-CRB-1 v. KWOK CHEUNG CHOW, AKA Raymond MEMORANDUM* Chow, AKA Shrimp Boy, AKA Ha Jai, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 3, 2025 San Francisco, California Before: R. NELSON, COLLINS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge COLLINS. Defendant-Appellant Kwok Cheung Chow appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Chow argues that his criminal-trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. §2253(a), and we affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  We review both a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion and its rejection of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims de novo. See United States v. Reves, 774 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1464–65 (9th Cir. 1994)). While our review of the district court’s decision is de novo, our review of trial counsel’s performance is “highly deferential” to counsel’s decisions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). To establish that his counsel performed deficiently, a defendant must overcome “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. The deficient-performance standard is objective. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). And in addition to establishing deficient performance, an IAC claimant must “affirmatively prove prejudice.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. That means that the claimant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 1. Chow’s arguments that his counsel was inexperienced fail to substantiate his IAC claim. Tony Serra, “one of the nationally recognized defense counsel in the United States … who ha[d] had vast, vast experience,” served as Chow’s lead defense counsel. Serra gave the opening statement and closing argument, and he 2 24-4225 examined many of the key witnesses, including Chow. The district court observed that Serra “performed his services” in Chow’s trial “consistent with his reputation.” Moreover, Strickland’s deficient-performance standard is an objective one, so the mere fact that some of Chow’s other attorneys lacked substantial federal-criminal-trial experience cannot, on its own, establish deficient performance. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. Ultimately, Chow has not met his burden to demonstrate IAC simply because some members of his team were inexperienced. See Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6