United States v. Ruiz-Hernandez

── United States v. Ruiz-Hernandez ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 24-2759, 24-6394 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00197-JLR-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JESUS RUIZ-HERNANDEZ, AKA Christo Jesus Escobar Solares Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 19, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Jesus Ruiz-Hernandez appeals from his conviction of twenty-one counts charging money laundering and forced labor involving seven victims. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), (d), 1594(a), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(A), 2; 8 U.S.C. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B)(ii). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. 1. We dismiss Ruiz-Hernandez’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice to his ability to raise it in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings. “As a general rule, we do not review challenges to the effectiveness of defense counsel on direct appeal.” United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). There are “two extraordinary exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to permit determination of the issue, or (2) where the legal representation is so inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (citation modified). Neither exception applies here. Ruiz-Hernandez identifies several instances of allegedly deficient performance, but as “counsel has not yet had an opportunity to explain his actions” and the court “cannot tell from the record whether [each decision] was a calculated stratagem or a mere oversight,” the record is not sufficiently developed. Id. at 606 (citation modified). Nor was counsel’s performance so inadequate as to obviously violate the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Osorio-Arellanes, 112 F.4th 647, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2024). 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruiz- 2 24-2759 Hernandez’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. See United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). “In general, a defendant who can afford to hire counsel may have the counsel of his choice unless a contrary result is compelled by ‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice.’” United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007)). The motion to withdraw was made less than three months before trial, after trial had been continued for almost a year at Ruiz-Hernandez’s request. The district court denied the motion based on its timing and the likely impact on the trial date, potential witness availability issu