Yomi v. Del Toro

── Yomi v. Del Toro ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FRANCIS YOMI, No. 24-7641 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-05199-KKE v. MEMORANDUM* CARLOS DEL TORO, Secretary of the Navy, Defendant - Appellee, and DOJ - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DOJ - OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Kymberly K. Evanson, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 21, 2026** Before: RAWLINSON, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  In this Title VII case, Plaintiff-Appellant Francis Yomi appeals the district court’s orders (1) dismissing his motions for entry of default; (2) denying him leave to amend his complaint; (3) compelling his deposition testimony; (4) denying his motion to compel production of certain documents and information from the Navy; (5) terminating Yomi’s motion for summary judgment as untimely; and (6) granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 and we affirm. 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yomi’s two motions for entry of default. See First Idaho Corp. v. Davis, 867 F.2d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 1989). The district court properly denied Yomi’s first motion because Yomi filed it before perfecting service on the Secretary of the Navy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Yomi’s second motion was likewise meritless because he sought default after Defendants had timely filed their answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yomi leave to amend his complaint to add a claim that he had voluntarily withdrawn before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2016. See Kamal v. Eden Creamery, LLC, 88 F.4th 1268, 1275 (9th Cir. 2023). At the latest, Yomi received written notice on December 6, 2020, that the EEOC would not act on this claim. Yomi then had 90 days to file this claim in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1) (providing that an employee has 90 days to file a claim in federal court once 2 24-7641 the EEOC provides notice that it will not act on the claim); id. §§ 2000e-16(c), (d) (making § 2000e-5(f)(1) applicable to government employees); see also Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266–67 (9th Cir. 1992). But Yomi did not try to add the claim into this case until 2024—several years after the limitations period had run. Amending the complaint to add this long-time-barred claim would have been futile. 3. Yomi argues the district court abused its discretion by compelling his deposition testimony after the Navy had already deposed him in the underlying EEOC proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring a party to “obtain leave of court” to take a deposition if “the deponent has already been deposed in the case”). Yomi contends that the EEOC proceedings and his federal lawsuit comprise the same “case” within the meaning of Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(ii), and that the Navy was therefore required to seek leave from the district court befo