Hoch v. Gaughan South, LLC

── Hoch v. Gaughan South, LLC ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TODD HOCH, DBA South Point Hotel and No. 25-1848 Casino, Added SAC #32, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00066-GMN-BNW Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* GAUGHAN SOUTH, LLC, doing business as South Point Hotel and Casino; LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOHN MONJE, Added SAC #32; ANGEL LOPEZ, Added SAC #32; VINCENT MIOZZA, Added SAC #32; JORDAN ETZIG, Added SAC #32; A. PAVLOV, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 19, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: WARDLAW, BEA, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  Plaintiff-Appellant Todd Hoch (“Hoch”) was seized for trespassing when he refused to leave the South Point Casino (“Casino”) after refusing to wear his face mask in compliance with Nevada’s statewide mask mandate. Hoch then sued Gaughan South LLC d/b/a South Point Hotel and Casino (“South Point”), Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”), and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officer Alexandr Pavlov (“Pavlov”) (collectively “Defendants”). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to all of Hoch’s causes of action because South Point personnel and Pavlov had legal authority to detain Hoch. Hoch timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). In considering a motion for summary judgment, where, as here, the nonmoving party offers a version of events that “no reasonable jury could believe” because it is contradicted by a videotape, courts should “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). We affirm. 1. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to South Point on Hoch’s § 1983 claim because South Point personnel had probable cause to arrest Hoch for trespassing under Nevada’s trespass statute NRS 207.200. Because South Point does not contest that its personnel acted under color of state law when they 2 25-1848 seized Hoch for trespassing, the sole question is whether South Point violated Hoch’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Chudacoff v. U. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Amendment bars only searches and seizures that are unreasonable. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). “In order to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, an arrest must be supported by probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.” Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 236 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Hoch’s own declaration in support of his motion for partial summary judgment states that he “got up to leave” after South Point personnel “informed [him] that they did not want [him] in the casino anymore that day.” This constitutes a “sufficient warning” under NRS 207.200(2)(e