Martinez v. City of Phoenix

── Martinez v. City of Phoenix ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PHIL MARTINEZ; JORGE SORIA, No. 25-1518 D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellants, 2:21-cv-01212-DGC v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation; BENJAMIN MOORE, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity; JOSEPH GAGE, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity; JEFFREY MIEL, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity; ERICK SELVIUS, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity; DOUGLAS MCBRIDE, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees, and BOBBI JO COZAD, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity, DARRELL MAGEE, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity, CLIFFORD C. LEWIS, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. DIANA PINEDA, a City of Phoenix Police Officer, in his individual capacity, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 3, 2026 Submission Vacated February 6, 2026 Resubmitted May 26, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: CALLAHAN, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence by Judge CALLAHAN. Plaintiffs Phil Martinez and Jorge Soria appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest and excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court concluded that those claims were barred by claim preclusion based on Plaintiffs’ prior Arizona state court actions that were dismissed for failure to comply with Arizona’s notice-of-claim statute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand. 1. We review de novo whether claim preclusion bars a plaintiff’s claims. Wojciechowski v. Kohlberg Ventures, LLC, 923 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2019). At the motion to dismiss stage, we accept as true the facts recited in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. Id. at 688 n.2. Arizona law “governs the question [of] 2 25-1518 whether [Plaintiffs’] . . . claims are barred by claim preclusion.” Cutts v. Richland Holdings, Inc., 953 F.3d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 2019). Under Arizona law, claim preclusion requires, among other elements, a “final judgment on the merits.” Lawrence T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 438 P.3d 259, 262 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (citation modified). Arizona procedural rules define when a judgment is final. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), a “judgment as to all claims and parties is not final unless the judgment recites that no further matters remain pending and that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(c).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Arizona courts take a strict approach to Rule 54(c)’s requirements. See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 380 P.3d 659, 665 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). An appellate court “lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from a judgment that does not resolve all claims as to all parties and that does not include” the requisite language. Madrid v. Avalon Care Center-Chandler, L.L.C., 338 P.