Qiu v. Blanche

── Qiu v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT QINGXIN QIU, No. 25-3393 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-532-714 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 19, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Qingxin Qiu, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) decision dismissing his appeal. The Immigration * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that Petitioner was not credible and therefore denied the petition. The BIA upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he REAL ID Act requires that credibility determinations be made on the basis of the ‘totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.’” Id. at 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (REAL ID Act)). Relevant factors include, among other things, implausibility and internal inconsistency. See id. at 1039-40. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The BIA pointed to several inconsistencies and omissions underlying the IJ’s decision: Petitioner’s omission of key details and allegations in earlier proceedings; inconsistencies surrounding the timeline of events related to Petitioner’s allegations; implausibilities related to Petitioner’s ability to receive official documents after having fled China and being subjected to surveillance; and apparent errors on Petitioner’s children’s birth certificates that raised concerns about their authenticity. These findings constitute substantial evidence because (i) these reasons are “specific and cogent,” (ii) the BIA explained why each reason undermined Petitioner’s credibility, and (iii) the BIA considered Petitioner’s explanations for 2 25-3393 each reason. Id. at 1044 (citation omitted). Based on the totality of the circumstances, these findings are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 969 n.14 (9th Cir.1998) (“[W]e may not reweigh the evidence . . . We merely determine whether the evidence compels [] a [contrary] conclusion.”) (emphasis in original). Petitioner argues that substantial evidence does not support the adverse credibility finding for three reasons. First, Petitioner contends that the IJ did not give him an opportunity to address certain findings during the hearing. But the BIA explicitly stated that its decision did not rest on those specific reasons, and thus they are not relevant to our analysis. See Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006) (Our review “is limited to the BIA's decision, except to the