Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission v. Timmer

── Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission v. Timmer ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 26, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LAWYERS FOR FAIR RECIPROCAL No. 25-3551 ADMISSION, D.C. No. 2:24-cv-02175-GPC Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court; JOHN R. LOPEZ IV, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; ROBERT BRUTINEL, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; CLINT BOLICK; JAMES P. BEENE, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; KATHERYN KING, Justice, Arizona Supreme Court, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Gonzalo P. Curiel, Senior District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 21, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: GOULD, BERZON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission (“LFRA”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of its complaint against members of the Arizona Supreme Court and the district court’s pre-filing order applicable to LFRA’s attorney, Joseph Giannini. We affirm. 1. LFRA’s complaint challenged Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34(e), which permits attorneys licensed in other states to be admitted in Arizona without taking the Arizona Bar examination if their state of licensure extends similar privileges to lawyers admitted in Arizona. LFRA argues that Rule 34 violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment, and the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 1 These arguments are squarely foreclosed by our prior opinions involving challenges to bar admission rules brought by the same attorney now representing LFRA. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Prac. (“NAAMJP”) v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2014), LFRA v. United States, 1 LFRA’s briefing does not challenge the dismissal of its procedural due process claims, its First Amendment right to petition or association claims, or its claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. Nor does it meaningfully develop its argument that the Rule is a prior restraint. These claims are therefore forfeited. Jones v. Allison, 9 F.4th 1136, 1139 n.6 (9th Cir. 2021); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review.”). 2 25-3551 141 F.4th 1056, 1067-72 (9th Cir. 2025) (“LFRA I”), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 890 (2025). 2. A three-judge panel is bound by Circuit precedent unless “an intervening Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.” United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). Recognizing as much, LFRA argues that several recent Supreme Court cases—National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018), Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. P