Michael Thomas Hupke v. The People of the State of Colorado.

── Michael Thomas Hupke v. The People of the State of Colorado. ── Court: Supreme Court of Colorado Date: May 18, 2026 Category: General 1 2026 CO 31 Michael Thomas Hupke, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado. Respondent No. 24SC513 Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc May 18, 2026 2           Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 23CA106          Judgment Affirmed           Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado           Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado           CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined. 3           OPINION 4           MÁRQUEZ CHIEF JUSTICE          ¶1 Under section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2025), any person who attempts to influence a public servant's actions "by means of deceit" commits a class 4 felony. In this case, we are asked to determine whether a person acts "by means of deceit" when using a third party to lie to a public servant on their behalf.[1]          ¶2 Michael Thomas Hupke was convicted of violating section 18-8-306 for instructing his mother to lie to his parole officer in an effort to persuade the officer to lift Hupke's parole hold. His mother complied and conveyed the false statement. Hupke argues that section 18-8-306 criminalizes only a defendant's own direct deceit and does not extend to defendants who engage a third party to commit deceptive acts on their behalf. In other words, he argues that he did not act "by means of deceit" for purposes of section 18-8-306 because he did not personally lie to the parole officer. We disagree.          ¶3 The plain and ordinary meaning of the word "deceit" is broad, encompassing any trick, contrivance, or act designed to lead someone to believe something that is not true. Using a third party to convey a lie, especially someone who may appear more trustworthy or believable, is an act designed to lead the 5 recipient of that information to believe something that is not true. We therefore hold that the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306 encompasses a defendant's use of a third party to engage in deception.          ¶4 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Hupke's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.          I. Facts and Procedural History          ¶5 In November 2021, Hupke was arrested and booked into county jail. At the time, Hupke was on parole for unrelated charges, so he was placed on a parole hold pending review by his parole officer. Hupke had moved his residence without informing his parole officer, which was a violation of a condition of his parole. Hupke called his mother from jail, explained the situation, and emphasized the importance of getting the parole hold lifted so he could be released from jail. Hupke instructed his mother not to tell his parole officer that he had already moved, but instead to say that he was in the process of moving. Hupke's mother ultimately conveyed the false information to the parole officer as instructed.          ¶6 Hupke's phone calls were recorded and reviewed, and he was charged with one count of attempt to influence a public servant under section 18-8-306. The phone calls were admitted as evidence at trial, and Hupke was convicted. 6          ¶7 On appeal, Hupke challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. People v. Hupke, 2024 COA 73, ¶ 1, 557 P.3d 816, 817. Specifically, he argued that the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306 requires a defendant to personally deceive a public servant. Id. Here, Hupke contended, the prosecution presented no evidence that he pe