Chronister, Sheriff of Hillsborough County v. Prahalad
── Chronister, Sheriff of Hillsborough County v. Prahalad ──
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Date: May 22, 2026
Category: General
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CHAD CHRONISTER,
in his official capacity as Sheriff of Hillsborough County,
Appellant,
v.
JOHN PRAHALAD,
Appellee.
No. 2D2025-1039
May 22, 2026
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Helene L. Daniel,
Judge.
Jeffrey D. Jensen, Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, Tampa, for
Appellant.
Brian J. Lee of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
KHOUZAM, Judge.
Sheriff Chad Chronister timely appeals a final judgment entered in
favor of John Prahalad after a jury trial regarding an officer-involved
motor vehicle accident. On appeal, the Sheriff asserts that the trial court
should have granted a mistrial and also that the court misapplied the
sovereign immunity cap in multiple ways.
As to the mistrial ruling, we find no error and comment no further.
But as we now explain, one of the challenges regarding sovereign
immunity has merit; the trial court misapplied a setoff in the final
judgment but properly included postjudgment interest. We therefore
reverse and remand only to correct the setoff.
The Sheriff asserts that the trial court erred on the issue of
sovereign immunity (1) by applying a setoff for prior payments against
the verdict rather than against the damages cap and (2) by including
postjudgment interest in the judgment. Mr. Prahalad concedes that the
judgment should be amended to apply the setoff against the damages
cap, but maintains that the portion addressing postjudgment interest is
correct. We agree with Mr. Prahalad on both points.
Through section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (2017), the State of
Florida has waived sovereign immunity for liability for torts, to an extent.
As relevant here, section 768.28(5) provides that state actors are liable
like private individuals, except they shall never be liable for punitive
damages or prejudgment interest. Further, all liability to an individual is
capped at $200,000; any portions of a judgment exceeding this cap "may
be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature." Id.
Discussing this statute, the Florida Supreme Court has explained:
The maximum amount of the state's liability to any one
claimant arising out of any one incident or occurrence,
therefore, is [the applicable statutory cap], including
damages, costs, and post-judgment interest. If the damages
alone are less than [the statutory cap], then costs and post-
judgment interest are recoverable, but only up to the
maximum liability of [the statutory cap].
Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 422 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1982)
(footnote omitted). Thus, absent further legislative action, the statutory
cap is a bright-line limitation on the amount a claimant can recover.
2
Even so, under this framework, postjudgment interest is properly
included in the judgment, and it "should be calculated upon the actual
damages determined by the jury," not the capped amount of the
judgment. Id. Consequently, when the jury's damages finding exceeds
the statutory cap, "section 768.28(5) authorizes the rendition of
judgment in excess of the maximum amount which the state can be
required to pay." Id. Harmonizing the legislation, the court clarified:
The purpose of this provision is so that the excess can be
reported to the legislature and then paid in whole or in part
by further act of the legislature. These provisions recognize
that the judgment and post-judgment assessments to be
entered of record should upon motion of the plaintiff be the
full amount of actual damages suffered, costs, and post-
judgment interest and not the amount of the defendant's
lia
{# E23 (Nick, ruling section 1 answer 10): quoting a bill or a court opinion works
the way quoting a news article works. Select a passage above and the same panel
opens: the passage goes to the official you choose, with this document's own
address as its source and its own type. #}