Cosme v. State of Florida

── Cosme v. State of Florida ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: May 22, 2026 Category: General DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JOSE LEONARDO COSME, JR., Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 2D2025-0001 May 22, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Joshua Riba, Judge. Matthew R. McLain of McLain Law, P.A., Longwood, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Krystle Celine Cacci, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. KHOUZAM, Judge. Jose Leonardo Cosme, Jr., appeals his judgment and sentence on two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation on a victim less than twelve years of age. Because the State improperly bolstered the victim's testimony, we are constrained to reverse for a new trial. Cosme was charged with the lewd or lascivious molestation of his goddaughter, A.D. At trial, A.D. testified that she believed Cosme was her father. She would visit and stay with him often. She was about eight years old when Cosme began touching her inappropriately. The abuse, which she described in detail during her testimony, would occur almost every time she visited him. This continued until, at ten years old, she disclosed the abuse to a school guidance counselor. She then recounted the abuse to a school resource officer and a child protection team interviewer. Without any physical evidence of abuse, the victim's allegations were the crux of the State's case against Cosme, and his only theory of defense was that the victim's story was fabricated. The State presented recordings of the victim's statements through testimony from the child protection team interviewer and school resource officer who interviewed her. But the State went further by also eliciting testimony from these witnesses to vouch for the victim's credibility. For example, the child protection team interviewer testified that he observed no signs of deception from the victim; that the victim had no motive to fabricate; that her disclosure, unlike in other cases, did not appear influenced; and that he "found no inconsistencies" in her account. Then, the school resource officer testified that the victim was successfully truth qualified; that she appropriately answered his questions; that she "knows the difference between telling the truth and a lie"; and that he, from his perspective as a law enforcement officer, "did not see any signs of deception with her." After that, the State called another officer, who had never had any personal interaction with the victim, to testify based on his professional review of the reports and the victim's interviews that she was "reliable" and "very consistent" and that "each time she gave the account, it was described the same way." He contrasted her behavior with that of children who lie, opining that she exhibited none of the typical discrepancies. 2  Cosme argues that, in the context of his trial, this testimony constitutes improper bolstering and that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing it. We agree. "It is elemental in our system of jurisprudence that the jury is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses. Thus, it is an invasion of the jury's exclusive province for one witness to offer his personal view on the credibility of a fellow witness." Davis v. State, 360 So. 3d 809, 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (quoting Sierra v. State, 230 So. 3d 48, 51-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)). "This principle applies equally in cases where the testimony offered directly comments on the truthfulness of a minor victim." Smith v. State, 292 So. 3d 46, 48-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (collecting cases). Indeed, where a case turns on the credibility of the victim—a common occurrence in molestation cases like this one— improper bolstering can be particularly harmful. See Johnson v. State