Niven v. Universal Music Group, Inc.

── Niven v. Universal Music Group, Inc. ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALAN G. NIVEN; HEATHER VINCENT No. 24-7273 NIVEN, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-07917-SVW-PVC Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v. UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC., a Delaware corporation, doing business as Capitol Records Group; UMG RECORDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation; JOHN DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 18, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).  Alan Niven, and his wife Heather Vincent-Niven (“the Nivens”), sued Universal Music Group and UMG Recordings (collectively “UMG”), alleging they improperly charged Alan roughly $1 million dollars for “unrecouped [] video expenses” from when he was the manager and producer of the platinum-selling rock band, Great White. UMG moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion and denied leave to amend, and the Nivens now appeal. We review dismissals based on the statute of limitations de novo. McGreevey v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 897 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). And we review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Reddy v. Litton, Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 1. The Nivens first allege that the statute of limitations should not apply because UMG fraudulently induced them to enter into a tolling agreement. To allege fraud, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), identifying “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud. Bodenburg v. Apple, Inc., 146 F.4th 761, 771 (9th Cir. 2025) (simplified). Conclusory allegations alone are not enough. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, plaintiffs must “give defendants notice of the particular [fraudulent] misconduct . . . so that [defendants] can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 2 24-7273 United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2001) (simplified); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). For example, we have previously found that a party comes short where they allege general misrepresentation but “do[] not identify any specific misrepresentations or specify when and where they occurred.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107 (citing Lee, 245 F.3d at 1051). The Nivens argue that UMG had falsely assured them they would investigate the charge and provide an explanation for it. But that is the extent of the fraud allegations. The Nivens do not provide any details about their communications with UMG, how frequently the parties talked, or anything to show that UMG lied about investigating the accounting as to induce them to enter the tolling agre