Bazan-Huerta v. Blanche

── Bazan-Huerta v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GAUDENCIO BAZAN-HUERTA, No. 25-1278 Agency No. Petitioner, A213-082-692 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 19, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Gaudencio Bazan-Huerta seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his motion to dismiss removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) and denying his renewed motion to dismiss removal proceedings under the same provision. We * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review the BIA’s denial of a motion to dismiss for abuse of discretion but review its underlying legal conclusions de novo. Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). “The Board abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Cruz Pleitez v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the petition. 1. The BIA did not err when it denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) because that regulation is inapplicable here. Indeed, § 1239.2(c) permits the Government to move for dismissal on certain enumerated grounds. See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) (“After commencement of [removal] proceedings . . . government counsel or an officer enumerated in 8 C.F.R. 239.1(a) may move for dismissal of the matter on the grounds set out under 8 C.F.R. 239.2(a)). But here, Petitioner—not the Government—moved to dismiss. Petitioner presented no evidence that the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS’s”) 2022 email noting that it did not oppose dismissal as a matter of prosecutorial discretion still represented DHS’s position on the matter in 2025, when the case came before the BIA. Even assuming DHS did not oppose the motion to dismiss in 2025, its email did not indicate its intent to join Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, nor did it cite an enumerated ground for dismissal under § 239.2(a). And Petitioner cites no valid authority in support of his assertion that the 2 25-1278 BIA must grant an unopposed motion to dismiss. Because § 1239.2(c) does not permit dismissal on a petitioner’s motion, the BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process when it denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss under § 1239.2(c). 2. Petitioner also argues that the BIA abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by failing to address his argument that the IJ wrongfully denied his motion to dismiss. Indeed, “IJs and the Board are not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner entirely.” Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (cleaned up). But the agency is not obligated to address conclusory statements that the IJ erred. See Rizo v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 2016) (A “conclusory statement [that] does not ap