Diaz v. Blanche

── Diaz v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE ALEXANDER DIAZ, No. 25-2590 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-941-313 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 19, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Jose Alexander Diaz petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying Diaz (1) asylum, (2) withholding of removal, and (3) protection under the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994), our “review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2010) (simplified). We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). We deny the petition. 1. Diaz forfeited his asylum claim. An applicant for asylum must file his or her asylum application “within 1 year of the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States” unless he or she qualifies for an exception. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i). The IJ denied Diaz’s asylum application as time-barred. Diaz neither challenged this decision in his brief before the BIA, nor in his brief before this court. We thus deny the petition on this issue. 2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal. To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate a “clear probability,” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021), that “his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). Diaz’s proposed social group— “Salvadoran business owners who are targeted by criminal gangs”—is not 2 25-2590 cognizable. That proposed group encompasses any business owner in El Salvador who gangs seek to extort for financial gain, and thus “could include large swaths of people and various cross-sections of a community.” Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2021). So Diaz’s proposed social group lacks particularity. See Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). Before the BIA, Diaz also argued that his life or freedom would be threatened because of his political opinion. But the BIA refused to reach that issue, deeming it raised for the first time on appeal. See Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Although Diaz checked the “political opinion” box on his application, he did not introduce any evidence—or even make any argument— regarding political opinion before t