Orlonzo Hedrington v. United States

── Orlonzo Hedrington v. United States ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ORLONZO HEDRINGTON, No. 23-15191 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02333-KJM-DB and PETER L. FEAR, in his capacity as the MEMORANDUM* Trustee of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate of Orlonzo Hedrington, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 27, 2025 San Francisco, California Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff Orlonzo Hedrington appeals from the district court’s grant of * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. summary judgment for the United States in his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) action on two independent grounds: (1) res judicata and (2) insufficient evidence to support his negligence claim. We analyzed the first ground in an accompanying opinion, and we now turn to the second ground in this memorandum disposition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” United States v. Washington, 928 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2019). “We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Id. Hedrington’s evidence raises a triable issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment on the negligence claim under a “res ipsa loquitur” theory. Even if Hedrington did not use the term “res ipsa loquitur,” that was the theory underlying his arguments in the district court, and he had sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Because “it is claims that are deemed waived or forfeited, not arguments,” we reject the government’s argument that we may not consider that theory on appeal. United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004).1 1 Construing Hedrington’s pro se filings liberally, we also conclude that Hedrington has preserved the res ipsa loquitur argument on appeal. See Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Court has held pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than briefs by counsel and reads pro se pleadings generously, ‘however inartfully pleaded.’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 2  In California,2 “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is defined by statute as ‘a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.’” Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 843 P.2d 624, 627 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 646(b)). Though “the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff throughout the trial,” res ipsa loquitur “provides a presumption of negligence.” Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 288 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Kilgore v. Brown, 266 P. 297, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928)). The presumption generally applies when three conditions are met: “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and] (3) it must not h