United States v. Morin-Moreno

── United States v. Morin-Moreno ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 22, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1531 Appellee, D.C. No. 3:22-cr-02655-TWR-1 v. MARIA CARMEN MORIN-MORENO, MEMORANDUM* Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 23, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: HIGGINSON, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.** Maria Carmen Morin-Moreno appeals her conviction and sentence for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In the proceedings below, she moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that her three prior removal orders were invalid * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. under § 1326(d) and that the statute violates equal protection. She raises these issues again on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1. The district court did not err in denying Morin-Moreno’s motion to dismiss the indictment under § 1326(d). The district court concluded that the record demonstrated that Morin-Moreno had not exhausted her administrative remedies and that she had not shown she was denied the opportunity for judicial review. We review the denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. United States v. Valdivias-Soto, 112 F.4th 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2024). A defendant seeking to collaterally attack a removal order must demonstrate: (1) she exhausted her administrative remedies; (2) the removal proceedings improperly deprived her of an opportunity for judicial review; and (3) “entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); United States v. Palomar- Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 323 (2021). A removal order is fundamentally unfair where “a defendant’s due process rights were violated by defects” in the underlying deportation proceedings and she “suffered prejudice as a result.” Valdivias-Soto, 112 F.4th at 722 (quoting United States v. Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014)). Morin-Moreno challenges under § 1326(d) her three prior orders of removal. She concedes, however, that to upset her conviction, she must successfully attack all three. Because Morin-Moreno cannot demonstrate that she was prejudiced as 2 24-1531 the result of her 2016 expedited removal, nor that her 2009 stipulated removal or 2011 removal tainted her 2016 removal, her challenge fails. Assuming without deciding that the 2016 removal violated Morin-Moreno’s due process rights, she fails to demonstrate prejudice. Morin-Moreno alleges she faced prejudice because it was plausible that, had she not been subjected to the expedited removal proceedings, she could have received relief in the form of withdrawal of her application for admission, a permissible form of relief in expedited removal proceedings. See United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). But Morin-Moreno has not s