Castro Laguna v. Blanche

── Castro Laguna v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 21, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JONRRIS M. CASTRO LAGUNA, No. 25-2467 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-183-784 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 19, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: BENNETT, KOH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Jonrris Castro Laguna, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing Petitioner’s appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying Petitioner’s * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). application for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review the agency’s “particularly serious crime” determination for abuse of discretion. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Edgar G.C. v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2025). 1. The agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner’s conviction for inflicting corporal injury on his wife under California Penal Code § 273.5(a) was a particularly serious crime precluding Petitioner’s eligibility for withholding of removal. “The applicable legal standard to determine if a crime is particularly serious . . . requires the agency to ask whether ‘the nature of the conviction, the underlying facts and circumstances and the sentence imposed justify the presumption that the convicted immigrant is a danger to the community.’” Avendano-Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). “Our review is limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the appropriate factors and proper evidence to reach this conclusion.” Id. (cleaned up). In determining that Petitioner’s conviction was a particularly serious crime, the BIA first examined the elements of the crime and noted that § 273.5(a) requires 2 25-2467 the willful infliction of “corporal injury resulting in traumatic condition upon a victim.” The BIA then discussed the underlying facts and circumstances of the crime, and specifically, that Petitioner “wrapped his arm around his wife’s neck, pushed her inside his car, slapped her twice, and blocked the door to prevent her from exiting and that the police found his wife with a bloody nose and red face.” The BIA also considered Petitioner’s sentence of 364 days and noted that the IJ found that the sentence was “significant.” Because the BIA considered the appropriate factors and relied on proper evidence, it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner’s conviction was a particularly serious crime. Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestions, the BIA was not required to consider separately whether Petitioner was a danger to the community because “[i]t is irreb