Singh v. Blanche

── Singh v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 21, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GURSHARAN SINGH, No. 25-1690 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-385-160 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 11, 2026** Portland, Oregon Before: COLLINS and LEE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.*** Gursharan Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition. 1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh is not eligible for asylum because he has not established past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution in India. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). There is no well-founded fear if the applicant “‘could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country,’ unless doing so would be unreasonable under the applicant’s circumstances.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii)). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh’s experiences, even when aggregated, did not rise to the level of past persecution. See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 848 (2026) (holding that “the substantial- evidence standard” applies “to the agency’s conclusion that a given set of undisputed facts does not constitute persecution”). Singh described two incidents where he was attacked by members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) because he is a member of the rival Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“Mann”) political party. Following the 2 25-1690 second incident which also included a verbal threat on his life, Singh sought medical care at a clinic. He, however, did not suffer any permanent injuries and received only specified “tablets” and an “injection.” The BIA did not err in concluding that these incidents do not rise to the level of persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (establishing that persecution is an “extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive” (citation omitted)); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that threats and beating by native Indonesians, without mor