Michael Edward Norman v. State of Florida

── Michael Edward Norman v. State of Florida ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: May 20, 2026 Category: General FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2025-0693 _____________________________ MICHAEL EDWARD NORMAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. James M. Colaw, Judge. May 20, 2026 PER CURIAM. Michael Edward Norman was convicted of sexual battery on a child under 12 years old, lewd or lascivious molestation on a child under 12 years old, and lewd or lascivious exhibition. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Norman filed a motion that the court construed as a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The court denied the motion as facially insufficient, noting the motion failed to meet the oath requirement of rule 3.850(c). But, the court ruled, even if the motion had been properly sworn, the claims raised were procedurally barred because they were issues that were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal. The court did not dismiss the motion without prejudice to file a facially sufficient motion; it merely denied the motion. Norman requested leave to correct the insufficiency by submitting a properly sworn oath and asked the court to explain its rulings in greater detail, but the court denied the motion for rehearing. On appeal, Norman argues that Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 2007), and Rodriquez v. State, 993 So. 2d 152, 153-64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), require the court to provide him with an opportunity to amend his insufficient motion. Norman does not cite rule 3.850, even though it contains the procedure that a court must follow when confronted with an insufficient rule 3.850 motion. When a motion filed under rule 3.850 is timely (which Norman’s motion was) but insufficient, subdivision (h)(2) requires the court to “enter a nonfinal, nonappealable order allowing the defendant 60 days to amend the motion.” Only if an amended motion is still insufficient, or if the defendant fails to file a timely amended motion, may the court “enter a final, appealable order summarily denying the motion with prejudice.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(2). The Florida Supreme Court added this provision to rule 3.850 in 2013. In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. & Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 132 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 2013). 1 By failing to enter a nonfinal order allowing Norman to amend the motion, it appears that the court violated this rule provision. See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 339 So. 3d 496, 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (reversing an order denying a rule 3.850 motion as insufficient because it failed to permit the movant to file a facially sufficient motion within sixty days); McCray v. State, 278 So. 3d 773, 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (same); Mackey v. State, 219 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (same). But this conclusion is complicated by Spera itself, even though Norman cites it as authority for his claim that the court erred in failing to permit amendment. 1 At the time it was adopted, the current rule 3.850(h)(2) was codified as 3.850(f)(2). See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. 3.850 & 3.853, 419 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2025) (renumbering subdivision (f) of rule 3.850 to subdivision (h)). 2  The requirement for a court to allow a rule 3.850 movant to amend an insufficient motion stemmed from Spera. See Spera, 971 So. 2d at 761 (“[W]hen a defendant’s initial rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief is determined to be legally insufficient for failure to meet either the rule’s or other pleading requirements, the trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to allow the defendant at least one opportunity to amend the motion. . . . [T]he proper procedure is to strike the motion with leave to amend within a reasona