Monjaras-Segovia v. Blanche

── Monjaras-Segovia v. Blanche ── Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Date: May 20, 2026 Category: General NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FATIMA GUADALUPE MONJARAS- No. 25-5213 SEGOVIA; KATYA NOEMY GOMEZ- Agency Nos. MONJARAS, A205-479-099 A205-479-100 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 30, 2026** Before: RAWLINSON, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Mendoza. Fatima Guadalupe Monjaras-Segovia (“Petitioner”),1 a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Petitioner’s daughter, Katya Noemy Gomez-Monjaras, is a derivative beneficiary of Petitioner’s asylum claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claims. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition. Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. See Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the agency’s nexus finding for substantial evidence. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023). Under that standard, the agency’s finding is conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioner failed to establish the required nexus between her proposed particular social groups (“PSGs”)—“Salvadoran women” and “Central American women who are viewed as property”—and the harm she experienced and feared from two men, Ramiro Lemus (“Ramiro”) and Moise Gomez Contreras (“Moise”). Substantial evidence in the record supports that both Ramiro and Moise abused Petitioner for personal, sexual reasons and not because of Petitioner’s membership in her proposed PSGs. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). A reasonable adjudicator could therefore conclude that Petitioner failed to establish the required nexus between her past abuse and her proposed PSGs. Flores Molina, 37 F.4th at 2 25-5213 632. Evidence that El Salvador’s government poorly enforces laws against domestic violence and rape does not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s, because such generalized evidence is not relevant to Ramiro’s or Moise’s specific reasons for harming Petitioner. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that nexus hinges on “the persecutor’s motive”). Without establishing a nexus between her alleged persecution and proposed PSGs, Petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. See Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1018 (explaining that an asylum and withholding-of-removal applicant “must show a nexus between [the applicant’s] past harms or feared future harm and [the