DAVID OLSON, M.D. v. CHRISTOPHER and TAMMY COSTELLO, as Personal Representatives of the ESTATE OF RYAN COSTELLO, and INFINITE HEALTH COLLABORATIVE, P. A.

── DAVID OLSON, M.D. v. CHRISTOPHER and TAMMY COSTELLO, as Personal Representatives of the ESTATE OF RYAN COSTELLO, and INFINITE HEALTH COLLABORATIVE, P. A. ── Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida Date: May 15, 2026 Category: General SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case Nos. 6D2025-0824, 6D2025-1464 CONSOLIDATED Lower Tribunal No. 2021-CA-006331 _____________________________ DAVID OLSON, M.D., Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER and TAMMY COSTELLO, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF RYAN COSTELLO, deceased, et al., Appellees. _____________________________ Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Lee County. Alane Laboda, Judge. May 15, 2026 TRAVER, C.J. In these consolidated cases, David Olson, M.D., appeals two nonfinal orders addressing his defense of workers’ compensation immunity to the wrongful death lawsuit brought by the Estate of Ryan Costello, Costello was a Minnesota Twins baseball prospect. We lack jurisdiction over the first order and dismiss that part of this appeal. We have jurisdiction over the second order and affirm.  Dr. Olson moved for summary judgment on his immunity defense, contending that Minnesota law applied. If successful, this would have been an absolute defense to the Estate’s claims. The trial court denied the motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on Minnesota law’s applicability. The trial court observed, though, that Florida law might apply. And if this occurred, Dr. Olson’s immunity defense would fail because Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply to professional athletes. See § 440.02(17)(c)3., Fla. Stat. (2019) (“‘Employment’ does not include service performed by or as . . . [p]rofessional athletes.”). This is the first order on appeal. The trial court separately ordered the parties to explain why it should not enter summary judgment on the applicability of Florida law, having identified that there may be no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(f)(3) (“After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may . . . consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”). Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment and determined that Florida law applied to Dr. Olson’s immunity defense as a matter of law. It reiterated Florida workers’ compensation law did not bar the Estate’s claims. This is the second order on appeal. We have an independent duty to determine our jurisdiction. See Shassian v. Riverwalk Park, LLC, 365 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023). Florida Rule of 2 Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v) grants jurisdiction over nonfinal orders determining “that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers’ compensation immunity.” The Florida Supreme Court has held we lack jurisdiction under this rule over “[n]onfinal orders denying summary judgment . . . unless the trial court order specifically states that, as a matter of law, [workers’ compensation immunity] is not available to a party.” Hastings v. Demming, 694 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added); see Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 821 (Fla. 2004) (concluding district court lacked jurisdiction when “the circuit court’s order denying summary judgment did not explicitly state that the respondents would not be entitled to rely upon a workers’ compensation immunity defense at trial”). In determining our jurisdiction when reviewing an order denying summary judgment on workers’ compensation immunity, we limit our review to the order on appeal, and we canno